

199.4  
D321c  
r.2  
c.2

UNIVERSITY  
OF FLORIDA  
LIBRARIES



COLLEGE COLLECTION

**CONTEMPORARY  
EAST  
EUROPEAN  
PHILOSOPHY**

Edward D'Angelo  
David H. DeGrood  
Dale Riepe  
*Editors*

**Vol. II**



CONTEMPORARY  
EAST  
EUROPEAN  
PHILOSOPHY

Edited by

Edward D'Angelo

University of Bridgeport

David H. DeGrood

Editor-in-Chief

Dale Riepe

State University of New York at Buffalo

Contributing Editors

John C. Cullen

New Haven College

Southern Connecticut College


Robert M. Kunz

D'Youville College

Vol. II

Spartacus Books  
115 Balsam Avenue  
Bridgeport, Conn.

1970



## Preface

Our contributors to this second volume are Igor Hrušovský of Comenius University (born 1907). His interests include the theory of knowledge and the history of philosophy. His books include: Theory of Science (1941; Slovak); Development of Scientific Thinking (1942; Slovak); Francis Bacon and the Growth of English Philosophy (1945; Slovak); Engels as a Philosopher (1946; Slovak); Problems of Noetics (1948; Slovak); Structure and Apperception of the Concrete (1966; German); and Problems of Philosophy (1970; German). Nikolai Iribadžakov was born in 1920, and is presently Professor of Philosophy at Sofia University, Bulgaria. He is editor-in-chief of the theoretical magazine Novo vreme. His major field of interest is contemporary Western philosophy. Among his publications are: Contemporary Critics of Marxism (1960); Philosophy and Biology (1967); and Clio before the Jury of Bourgeois Philosophy. Milan Machovec was born in 1925, and is presently Professor of Philosophy at Charles University in Prague. He is interested in questions relating to atheism and religion, as well as ethics; he was one of the initiators of the Marxist-Christian dialogues in Europe. He has written books on Jan Hus, the history of heretical and sectarian movements, a biography of Karl Barth, one on the meaning of human life, and biographies on St. Augustine and T. G. Masaryk. Howard L. Parsons is one of the leaders since World War II in the deepening dialogue between philosophers of East and West during the Cold War period. Parsons has worked continuously for world peace and mutual understanding between the two sets of world powers. He is presently Bernhard



Professor of Philosophy and Chairman at the University of Bridgeport. Dobrin Spassov was born in 1926, and is at present Professor of Philosophy, Sofia University, Bulgaria. His main philosophical concerns are in epistemology and logic. Among his works are: Analysis of Knowledge (1969) and Symbolic Logic (1969). The contributors' essays comprise the remaining articles of the second chapter and the first two essays of chapter three. The index for volumes I and II are included in this volume.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### Volumes I & II

Preface.....	pp. i-
Chapter I. Philosophy and Human Practice.....	pp. 4-60.
György Márkus, Marx's Earliest Epistemology.	pp. 4-15.
Stéfan Anguélov, Reflection and Practice....	pp. 16-28.
Mihailo Marković, Human Nature and Social Development.....	pp. 29-44.
Mihály Vajda, Nature, Society, and Praxis...	pp. 45-60.
Chapter II. Marxism-Leninism.....	pp. 61-135.
Auguste Cornu, The Formation of Historical Materialism.....	pp. 61-83.
Nikolai Iribadjakov, The Meaning of History.	pp. 90-107.
Milan Machovec, World Dialogues.....	pp. 108-121.
Howard L. Parsons, Lenin's Theory of Personality.....	pp. 122-135.
Chapter III. Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic..	pp. 136-
Dobrin Spassov, Refutation of Linguistic Philosophy.....	pp. 136-154.
Igor, Hrušovský, Being and Structure.....	pp. 155-172.



Index.....pp. 173-176.

Corrigenda to vols. I & II.....p., 177.



Nikolai Iribadjakov

"The Meaning of History"\*

The evolution of the problems in the philosophy of history shows that the issue of the meaning of history has been most important during the periods of deep social crises and revolutionary change. This is why it is not at all strange that at present this problem is of major importance in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and bourgeois ideology; it is not surprising that bourgeois philosophers and historians since Hegel have never dealt so much with the problem of the "meaning of history" as during the period after the October Revolution and after World War II. The problem of the meaning of history is a real one and exceptionally important. But the manner of posing and solving it stems from philosophical and historical class-affiliations. Contemporary bourgeois writers have written a great deal about the meaning of history, but they can neither pose the problem correctly nor solve it, because their reactionary class-interests constitute their starting point.

Bourgeois writers have often started from the assumption that history is directed towards a final and supreme goal. This teleological and finalist view is that of objective idealism. It is to be noted, however, that teleological and finalist conceptions of history have been developed extra-theologically as well. There have been secular forms, before Marxism appeared, which played progressive roles to a certain extent, as far as the

\* Article abridged for inclusion in this volume.



development of scientific knowledge and society were concerned. The views of Herder and Hegel whose names are linked with the establishment of the philosophy of history as an independent discipline, as well as those of Kant and Fichte, were dominated by historical optimism. Herder saw this goal in the realization of the ideal of "humaneness", Kant in "lawful order and eternal peace", Fichte in the "ideal state". But its major exponent was Hegel.

In their Holy Family, Marx and Engels discerned that Hegel's view of history was "nothing but the speculative expression of the Christian-Germanic dogma of the opposition between spirit and matter, between God and the world."<sup>1</sup> But this does not mean that it was identical with the theological fatalism of Augustine and his followers. Hegel did not divide history into "earthly" and "heavenly", and also did not look for an explanation outside of human history. In his view, history is a regular, necessary process of the self development of the Spirit. Hegel did not exclude freedom from history, nor did he oppose it to necessity, but rather conceived of history in terms of conscious necessity. World History is thus a progressive recognition of freedom, progress recognized as necessary.

Hegel's teleology, as well as his conception that history is a progressive, ascending process of evolution, made a deep imprint on the philosophical and historical views of the majority of 19th century bourgeois thinkers. Thus Feuerbach considered that the final goal of history was the realization of man's "true essence", Stirner of the "unique one", Comte of "scientific and industrial society", etc. On the whole, bourgeois philosophy in the 19th century was dominated by an optimistic conception of history, the meaning of history being identified with



progress. Such a view was an integral part of the credo of many bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, and historians even during the first two decades of our own century. "Between the middle of last century up to 1914", wrote Carr, "it was scarcely possible for a British historian to conceive of historical change except as change for the better."<sup>2</sup> During the period of imperialism, and especially the contemporary, transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the question of the meaning of history becomes more topical; simultaneously, fundamental changes were taking place in the bourgeois conception of the problem, changes which clearly and pointedly revealed the reactionary and anti-scientific nature of the contemporary bourgeois philosophy of history. Its role as an ideological weapon in defence of the bourgeois system and against Marxism-Leninism was illustrated.

Various views of history were overtly theological, mystical, or agnostic. Some have supported the view that history has a meaning, while denying the possibility of scientifically understanding it. At the same time, a theological fatalism was propounded, according to which history was created and directed by God, mankind being but a helpless tool in the hands of Divine Providence; thus there was nothing for man to do but submit to "fate". According to Berdyaev, for instance, history has an "inner meaning" which is "absolute", history being a preordained, universal process, a "mystery", having its beginning and end in "heavenly history". It is not difficult to see that Berdyaev has not only neglected Marxist theory but also all progressive philosophical and historical thought, in order to resurrect the obscurantist philosophy of history of Augustine, representing it as the dernier cri of contemporary philosophy of history. By way of Augustine, the Neo-Thomist J. Maritain states that



history develops according to a plan predetermined by God, directed towards the realization of goals set by God; hence, the task of the philosopher of history is to reveal the meaning placed into history by God. For Maritain, moreover, the meaning of history is a "mystery" which the human mind can only partially grasp, since man cannot attain a comprehension of God's ideas and aims. While such things can be contemplated, they cannot be scientifically understood.<sup>4</sup> In this way, the meaning of history becomes a "trans-historical meaning of historical tragedies", while the philosophy of history goes hand in hand with a theological and religious mysticism.

This view of the meaning of history penetrates into the philosophical and historical views of many contemporary bourgeois, professional philosophers, economists, sociologists, and historians, such as K. Jaspers, W. Röpke, A. Toynbee, F. Meinecke, Th. Schieder, etc. For Jaspers, "history has a deep meaning but it is not accessible to the human mind."<sup>5</sup> In Jaspers' view no one knows how and where human history originated, nor is its goal fathomable, since God has laid the ground of history. This same agnostic view is shared by Schieder. "Wherever we turn", he writes, "the goal of history is covered with the darkness of uncertainty, and the answer to the question about the direction of the<sup>6</sup> development of history remains very difficult for us."

Theoretically such views have nothing new to offer, but ideologically they are of great interest.

First, they mirror the deep crisis and the ideological poverty of the contemporary bourgeois philosophy of history (as well as the entire bourgeois ideology), mirroring also a helplessness in formulating progressive and scientifically grounded historical goals, as well as



failing to be clear and rational. That is the reason why they hide their helplessness by affirming agnosticism, theology, and mysticism.

Second, they reflect the downfall of bourgeois optimism, which had been connected with the notion of a regular and progressive historical development, substituting for it an extremely conservative and pessimistic outlook. Conceptions concerning historical progress are dropped for very popular theories about the alleged "cyclic development of cultures" (O. Spengler, E. Mayer, A. Toynbee, J. Baraclough, H. Frayer, etc.) which overtly proclaim "the decline of western culture". According to Carr:

Nicholas I of Russia is said to have issued an order banning the word "progress": nowadays the philosophers and historians of western Europe, and even the United States, have come belatedly to agree with him. The hypothesis of progress has been refuted. The decline of the west has become so familiar a phrase that quotation marks are no longer required.

Carr is right in admitting that bourgeois philosophical and historical theories of the "decline of western culture" are<sup>8</sup> "the characteristic ideology of a society in decline." They reflect the lack of an historical perspective and the doom of contemporary bourgeois society, its helplessness to find a way out of the constantly deepening crisis of its society and culture, its inability to stop the impetuous and victorious march of the socialist revolution. Berdyaev, Maritain, and Meinecke see nothing in history but "tragedy". "All of history", writes Meinecke, "is a tragedy." In his report "Geschichtlichkeit und überzeitlicher Sinn", delivered at the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna in 1968, the well-known West German, bourgeois philosopher,



Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, complained that, today throughout the bourgeois world the idea was spreading that in history "everything begins badly" and in the words of Jaspers "everything is doomed to failure". So much discussion is going on about "the futility of our existence", the fear of nothingness, and about the complete insecurity of contemporary life, that once again it is necessary to pose the "question of the meaning of our historicity."<sup>10</sup>

Thirdly, theological and finalist views of history with their pessimism, agnosticism, theological fatalism, and mysticism, are not only a passive reflection of the process of the deterioration and decline of contemporary bourgeois society and culture. They serve as ideological weapons of contemporary bourgeois society in the struggle against all progressive anti-imperialist movements, and above all against the communist movement and the socialist countries.

The historical merit of Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that, revealing the laws of socio-historical development, it exhibits the temporal nature of capitalism, setting before the working class and all exploited people a scientifically substantiated goal, viz. the destruction of the bourgeois system and the substitution of a new higher, and more just social system. The scientific and revolutionary ideas of Marxism-Leninism, together with the ideological and organizational activities of the various communist parties, the contagious example of the October Revolution, as well as other socialist revolutions, inspires the vast masses of the working people throughout the world for independent, conscious, organized, and purposeful historical activity. Contemporary bourgeois ideologists realize all this, and one of their tasks is to introduce ideological chaos among the masses,



as well as demoralization, lack of confidence, and passivity, in order to divert them from the road of independent revolutionary struggle. For instance, in his book, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, after declaring that the goal of history is cognitively unattainable, Jaspers leaves a door open, maintaining that in spite of everything philosophy could bring us "closer" to an understanding of this goal. He believes that in creating a "world empire", in which this "sole power" would "govern everybody", "world peace" will finally be achieved.<sup>11</sup> But it is not difficult to see behind this "divine" historical goal the earthly, mad plans of the American imperialists to create a world empire.

Wilhelm Röpke has expressed quite clearly the reactionary anti-communist nature of such notions concerning the "meaning" of history. To Röpke the struggle between socialism and capitalism, which struggle determines the basic content of our epoch, is nothing but a conflict between Satan and God. After expressing his confidence that "like all Satan's doings red totalitarianism will be liquidated", Röpke prophesizes: "Finally, things will happen which are not envisaged in the plan of dialectical materialism for the development of history, because only God knows how all this will end."<sup>12</sup> There is no sense in refuting such prophecies, since they are an expression of wishful thinking, and they rely on the ignorance and religious narrow-mindedness of people who still believe in a God directing the progress of world history.

The progressive segment of bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, and historians reject such theological and finalist conceptions. "I have no belief in Divine Providence," writes Carr, and he continues, "World Spirit,



Manifest Destiny, History with a capital H, or any other of the abstractions which have sometimes been supposed to guide the course of events; and I should endorse without qualification the comment of Marx: 'History does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, fights no battles. It is rather man, real living man who does everything, who possesses and fights.'<sup>17</sup> In the majority of cases, however, such a criticism is carried out from subjectivist and idealist positions, and is predominantly non-Marxist in character. According to such bourgeois writers as T. Lessing, W. Theimer, and K. Popper, history in itself has no meaning. The most pessimistically minded point out the senselessness of history and of human life. Others try to overcome historical pessimism by working out a new historical optimism which is subjective, idealistic, or voluntaristic, or in many cases irrational in character.

We may point out the popular book of Theodor Lessing, Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen, which appeared during World War I. Interwoven in Lessing's views are the irrationalism of Dilthey's "Lebensphilosophie", Neo-Kantian apriorism, and elements of existentialism. For this reason Lessing's views continue to have strong influence on contemporary bourgeois, philosophical trends. Lessing's enemy is not bourgeois finalism, but Marxism's notion of history as an objective, regular, ascending, and progressive process. According to Lessing, history is not an objective and regular process of development, rather the historian creates what we call causal relations, regularity, development, and other such meanings, out of subjective experiences which are actually empty. As in the case with other idealists, Lessing identifies history with historiography, from which it follows that the only way to make history is to write it. By denying the objective reality of the subject matter of historiography, he negates the possibility of the



existence of objective historical truth and of history as a science. This explains why Lessing grants everyone the right to create his own history, placing in it whatever "meaning" one pleases.

Both Heineman and von Rintelen do not take Lessing's views seriously due to Lessing's endless subjective arbitrariness, but in essence their views do not really differ from his. Like him they also feel that history itself is meaningless; its meaning has to be introduced from outside. The only way that sense can be given to history is in man's struggle to realize the "basic values" of "love", "beauty", etc., values which have an "atemporal" and "ahistorical" character, and are, consequently, not subjectively arbitrary. Other bourgeois writers, however, feel that the "value" of Lessing's work stems from the very voluntaristic and subjectively arbitrary views he proclaims. Thus, for instance, the well known anti-Marxist Walter Theimer considers Lessing's voluntarism as the most important ideological weapon in the struggle against the Marxist-Leninist view of history, particularly against its theory of historical inevitability. "Whoever shares the voluntarist view of history," Theimer writes, "has to abandon the hope found in the view that it is necessary to act in conformity with an objectively existing meaning of history... To insist that progress, humanism, or socialism are the meaning of history, that they are established by forces standing higher or by laws of its development, is wrong."<sup>14</sup> To Theimer, while his philosophy of history denies it all objective meaning, it does not doom humanity to a passive existence, rather it does just the opposite. "The sober concept," he declares, "that no meaning can be found in history does not entail skeptical passivity. It is more probable that it creates a basis for the will to create a certain meaning; the lack of any



definite meaning is even a precondition for this. Admitting the fact that until now history has not had any meaning does not lead to the conclusion that it shall never have a meaning. This depends entirely on the people who make history."<sup>15</sup> Thus socialism is not an objective historical necessity but an ethical ideal, which is dependent on what people wish to happen.<sup>16</sup>

Marxism refutes both the older theological views of history and the modern subjectivist notions. No one has criticized theological and finalist views of history so profoundly as Marx and Engels. In their works, The Holy Family and The German Ideology, they showed the utter groundlessness of all speculative idealistic views which see in history "a special sense which can be discovered."<sup>17</sup> They refuted every effort to personify history, to give it a "special character", converting it into a "metaphysical subject of which real human individuals are but the bearers."<sup>18</sup> "What is designated with the words 'destiny', 'goal',... 'idea' of ... history is nothing more than an abstraction formed from later history, from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history."<sup>19</sup> Marx and Engels opposed to such metaphysical and mystical views their own dialectical materialist conception, which rejects any preconceived plan of history. "Just as knowledge is unable to reach a perfected termination in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity," Engels wrote, "so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect 'state,' are things which can only exist in imagination."<sup>20</sup>

For Marxists two aspects should be distinguished when we speak about the meaning of history, viz. the objective and the subjective aspects; both of which are interconnected. Further, although the subjective aspect has its own comparative independence, the decisive role is played




by the objective aspect.

The objective aspect of the meaning of history, or the objective meaning of history, is expressed through the existence and action of its objective laws. History has objective meaning as far as the historical events are causally determined, and are not chaotic but represent a natural-historical process subjected to objective laws which determine the successions, mutual relations, and reciprocal determinations. In other words, the objective meaning of history is identical with its immanent logic.

If the meaning of history is nothing else but the objective logic of its development, then its analysis is the major task of every scientific social and historical theory. Stressing the importance of this task Lenin wrote: "The most important thing is that the laws of these changes have been discovered, that the objective logic of these changes and of their historical development has in its chief and basic features been disclosed.....The highest task of humanity is to comprehend the objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one's social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced and critical a fashion as possible."<sup>21</sup>

The scientific cognition of the objective meaning of history is the theoretical basis of the revolutionary and practical activities of the workers and communist movements in mapping their historical goals, as well as the means for achieving them. That is why it is not by chance that bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, and historians try to deny the objective meaning of history.

In their efforts to discredit Marxism bourgeois writers identify Marxist-Leninist teachings on the objective meaning of history with all sorts of teleological, theological,




fatalistic, and irrational views. B. Croce, for instance, ranks historical materialism together with theological and idealistic philosophies which find in history a "universal plan", or which find a kind of "logic" introduced into it by a transcendental force. Whether this force, says Croce, is called "Idea", "Spirit", or "matter" is unimportant. In the final analysis, it is "only a mask of a transcendent God who is the only one to invent such a plan, to make people do things, and to supervise their activities."<sup>22</sup> If such statements belonged to insignificant and ignorant critics of Marxism, one could explain them precisely as ignorance, and we would not have paid much attention to them. Here, however, we see a deliberate distortion of Marxism, since it is improbable that philosophers such as Croce and Popper fail to know that Marxism not only has nothing in common with such mystical views on the meaning of history but, on the contrary, it is their complete and uncompromising negation.

Just as our knowledge of natural science aids mankind in changing and mastering the blind forces of nature by means of its scientific knowledge of the logic of history, the working class and the various communist parties can realize their historical goals of preserving world peace, developing world democracy, liberating the dependent countries from imperialist oppression, doing away with the capitalist system, and building socialism.

The objective and subjective meanings of history are interrelated, but they are not identical. The "subjective" aspect of the meaning of history is quite different from the objective one, in that it is connected with the activities of men laying the foundations of history.

The basic drawback of all subjective, idealistic and voluntaristic views lies in the fact that they do not take into consideration this important difference



between the two aspects of the meaning of history. They fail to understand the objective dialectic of both in their interrelations and interdependence, and, as a result of this, they either confuse or identify the two aspects, or they oppose them to each other.

Setting the goal and struggling for its achievement presuppose creatures with consciousness, will power, and energy. History as an objective, natural-historical process has neither consciousness, nor will power, nor energy. It is nonsense, absurd, to speak of the meaning of history in such terms. However, history is not a chaotic play of unconscious and blind forces; it is not a process which takes place automatically, but is the activities of people organized in classes, nations, parties.


The existence of historical goals is undoubtedly a necessary element in making sense of the historical activities of the characters of history, viz. social classes, systems, and political parties. Taking these facts as a starting point, the subjective idealists and voluntarists draw the conclusion that people invest history with meaning, and this meaning can be different depending on their views and aims. According to Popper, in spite of the fact that history has no meaning, we can endow it with meaning, depending on our point of view. Thus, for instance, we could interpret history from the point of view of the struggle for an "open society", for a government of reason, justice, freedom, and equality, etc.<sup>23</sup> From that point of view with which we interpret history, the aims we set for it, and the meaning we give it, depend our conceptions and decisions, which in turn do not depend on any objective factors.

Neither nature nor history [writes Popper] can tell us what we ought to do. Facts, whether those of nature or those of history, cannot



make the decision for us, they cannot determine the ends we are going to choose. It is we who introduce purpose and meaning into nature and into history. Men are not equal; but we can decide to fight for equal rights. Human institutions such as the state are not rational, but we can decide to fight to make them more rational.<sup>24</sup> The theoretical basis for this subjective and idealistic conception of the meaning of history is the contention of Popper that between facts and decisions there is a "fundamental dualism", because "facts as such have no meaning; they can gain it only through our decisions."<sup>25</sup> Popper sees as one of Marxism's basic errors the attempt to overcome this dualism.


It is true that neither facts nor history make decisions or set tasks. Decisions are made by people, and they set tasks, but they do not map out their historical goals arbitrarily. Popper says that people are not equal, but we can decide to fight for equal rights. But what do "equal rights" and "we" mean? "Equal rights" could mean equal rights in the ownership of the means of production, equal rights in the distribution of the means of existence, in government and in making decisions on state problems, in education and recreation, equal rights to free national, political, economic, and cultural life. History, however, does not know a single case where the slave-owning class, or the feudal lords, or the bourgeoisie fought for such equality. This is the kind of equality the oppressed and exploited have fought and are fighting for, while the exploiting classes have always tried to fix inequality firmly. The question then is why different individuals, social classes, and systems (and their political parties) make different decisions on the same problem, why they set



different and opposing historical aims.

Just by posing these questions we can see the entire groundlessness of Popper's conception. The goals individuals set for themselves are not arbitrary, subjective, or capricious, and decisions are determined by the "facts" of social and historical life, i.e. by the objective social conditions of existence. Material conditions determine historical aims, and, since the material conditions of existence of different individuals in various social classes are different, their historical aims and decisions are different. Exploitation and oppression make the working class fight impulsively (or in an organized way) against social systems which are based on exploitation and oppression. The stronger and the clearer the consciousness of the masses as regards the real causes of their social inequality, exploitation, and oppression, the more active their struggle will be for social equality. Individuals and classes which have the political and economic power in their hands and build their existence and well being on the exploitation and oppression of others have an interest in the existence of social inequality, and that is why they fight with all their might to preserve and consolidate it.


All this shows that the "insurmountable and fundamental dualism" between "facts and decisions" is nonexistent. It is an invention, but like many other idealistic inventions it is not purely an invention, rather it is the result of a one-sided analysis, concentrating on certain aspects of human conscious activity, human cognition, and stressing their comparative independence. Men's social consciousness, their social and historical ideas, which are expressed in their projections of historical goals, are determined by their objective social and historical life, and are a reflection of this life, though they are not always in



accord with the objective logic of history.

If history and its facts were really void of any objective meaning, of any objective logic, people could endow them with any meaning they wished. But historical practice shows in an indisputable way that this is impossible, because history and its facts have their own objective logic independent of human consciousness and will power. Almost two thousand years now have elapsed since Christianity proclaimed peace among the classes, "love of neighbor", "nonviolence", "selflessness"; it has paid lip service to one of the ten commandments forbidding theft and plunder, but neither divine authority nor the threat of eternal tortures in hell made such norms the actual aim and meaning of history. In practice, the reactionary exploiting classes have carried out a policy of violence and plunder, of class, national, racial, and religious enmity, of wars and counter-revolutions; class struggle, then, has always been the real motor force in history. At the time when the bourgeoisie was a progressive and revolutionary class, its ideologists painted as the aim and meaning of its historical activities the struggle for the realization of "liberty, equality, and fraternity", but the practical result of this struggle was the establishment of bourgeois society, with its deep social inequality, plunderous and ruinous wars unheard of up till then in history, with class struggle and atrocity.

Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that, between the conscious activities of men setting tasks for themselves and the objective logic of history, there is a kind of abyss. When historical aims coincide with the requirements of the objective logic of history, when the means and the activity of the masses for achieving the historical goals also coincide with the requirements of this logic, then from a "spontaneous process" history




turns into a consciously directed process. Only in this sense can people "introduce" meaning into history. But it is enough for this activity to deviate from the objective logic of history or to violate it, and then history will make us experience clearly that we cannot impose on it the meaningless goals of our own choosing.

UNIVERSITY OF SOFIA

BULGARIA

Notes

1. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, trans. R. Dixon (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 114.
2. E. H. Carr, What is History? (London: Pelican, 1964), p. 38.
3. That is, the "atest thing out".
4. Cf. J. Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, London, 1959, pp. 22-23.
5. K. Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziele der Geschichte (München: R. Piper, 1950). p. 17.
6. Th. Schieder, "Grundfragen der neueren deutschen Geschichte". Historische Zeitschrift, B. 198, H. 1, 1961, p. 2.
7. E. H. Carr, op. cit., p. 112.
8. Ibid., p. 43.
9. F. Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen, Wiesbaden, 1946, p. 158.
10. Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, op. cit. In Akten des XIV.



- Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie (Wien: Herder, 1968), vol. I, p. 110.
11. Op. cit., pp. 17, 47, 242, 246.
12. Röpke, "Zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung". In Wo stehen wir heute? (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1960), p. 82.
13. Carr, op. cit., p. 49.
14. Walter Theimer, Der Marxismus (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1950), pp. 55-56.
15. Ibid., p. 56.
16. Cf. ibid., p. 53.
17. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 52.
18. The Holy Family, p. 107.
19. The German Ideology, p. 59.
20. Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, trans. C. P. Dutt (New York: International, 1941), pp. 11-12.
21. V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 325. In Collected Works, vol. 14 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962).
22. Croce, Die Geschichte als Gedanke und als Tat (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1949), pp. 57 & 221.
23. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), vol. II, p. 278.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., pp. 278-279.



Milan Machovec,

"World Dialogues"<sup>\*</sup>

In the last ten years there have been efforts in all parts of the world to enter into a dialogue. People of many different backgrounds and ideologies are communicating with each other. But this, of course, does not mean much yet. Sometimes language is only a substitute for real human contact. Not always when I speak to someone am I really interested in him. To live in dialogue really means to be interested in the other person and to be concerned for him. This life of dialogue is still in a programmatic stage in most parts of the world. In spite of this there have been during the last ten years more and more voices in East and West which are eager to get involved in this kind of dialogue. Perhaps it has something to do with the rising feeling of insecurity around the world in the last ten years.

In a time of highly developed technology and of atomic warfare, it is much easier to destroy mankind than to try to develop it and deepen the relationships among peoples. No power in the world is really able to solve its problems. Naturally in our particular situation, being a small country on the border of the so-called Eastern Bloc, bordering on the so-called Western Bloc, this dialogue is even of greater importance. It has been said that the Czechs are living in the heart of


\* Lecture delivered in New York City (1969), interpreted by W. Christoph Schmauch and transcribed by John Novotney. Permissions granted by the author and Rev. Schmauch. Lecture abridged for this volume.



Europe. It is not easy to live in the heart. Because we just cannot take time out like the people of Sweden have done for the last two hundred years, we are simply always in the center of things. If something happens in the north of Europe, for instance, we are part of it. At the time of the French Revolution in the 18th century, we were part of it also. Now we are in the East Bloc.

As has often been mentioned, we have to be bridge-builders. We are too small to have Messianic illusions, but we can function as bridge-builders. During the last ten years the dialogue has taken place mainly between Christians and Marxists. Among Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians on the one hand and, of course, Marxist philosophers on the other hand, the effort has been made to develop a basis for this type of dialogue. Why have we started this kind of dialogue, especially with the Christian Church? I believe this has something to do with the whole ecumenical atmosphere. Dialogue is an ecumenical method.

But why did Marxists engage in this dialogue? It certainly was not always the thing to do for Marxists. There are still strong tendencies in Marxism to be fanatical about these matters, and to have a Messianic calling. If the non-Marxist is honest and just in this matter, he would have to admit that former movements in history have had similar tendencies. Indeed, you are all aware of the fact that in Christendom there have been these anti-dialogical tendencies, which are basically a monologue and are monolithic. "Rome has spoken!"--that means, every problem has been solved. But the question comes to mind, Is authority all bad? Children and young people do need some authority. And it seems to be a fact that one needs authority when one is young in order to be able to overcome authoritarianism when one grows older. It is quite understandable that young



nations and young ideologies first have these aspects of being monologues and being monolithic.

There seem to be three stages of development within Marxism in the last one hundred years. There is first of all the founding period of Marx himself and his co-workers in the middle of the 19th century. It was Messianic enthusiasm for radical change. For many then, everything that had gone before was considered to be bad, and history really started only with that period--this was the kind of mentality which was part of the picture. So at that time there was no interest in dialogue with Christians. Christianity at the time was considered something medieval, something mythological which was totally unrelated to the human experience. In the second stage, too, though for different reasons, there was no interest in dialogue.

The second stage, if you want to make an analogy with the Christian Church, would have to be called our Constantinian era: a spreading of the message and also its dogmatization. There was great success for Marxism, especially in Russia, and with it great self-deception. And we can say that Marxism became institutionalized. In the first period, Marxists could be compared to the prophets. In the second period, more to church bureaucrats, if you will forgive me. This was rather successful, as in Christendom, but on the other hand it also involved some tragedy. I plead for democracy, but I also have great understanding for the fact that the Russians could do little with democratic methods. The tragedy is not that Lenin, and then Stalin, did not operate with democratic methods, but that the methods which they developed in their particular situations became established, fossilized. In that period, the emphasis was on organization, discipline and order, which, of course, was imposed from above. You can, of course, do a lot of things that way. But there are

卷之三

1


1

other aspects of the depth of the experiences of human authenticity which you cannot reach with that kind of organization.

In the 1950's there was a beginning of the third stage of this Marxist development, and I have to emphasize the word beginning. An important date is the 20th Party Congress in the Soviet Union in 1956. Of course, certain attempts were made to turn the clock back. But that third period cannot be stopped, just like the Ecumenical Movement in the Catholic Church cannot be stopped. What are the significant aspects of this third period; what are the new aspects? Primarily to be self-critical and to look at oneself in a critical way. This was not the case in the first and second stages of Marxist development. Before the Revolution and after it, one could say that Marxists lived in a sort of escatological expectation, everything was expected from the Revolution. In a situation like that you really have no interest in dialogue with the other person. But then in that self-critical period, it is quite logical that one would look around and see if someone else might have the answers for the questions which one has.


What are the reasons and sources for this self-critical attitude? Why are there today already hundreds and thousands of Marxists who are raising these questions?

First of all I would say there were unsuccessful experiences in certain areas; there were human tragedies. In the Stalinist period many suffered. A new search began, and the question, Why?, was being asked. Twenty years after the Revolution, you cannot live with the great expectations you had before the Revolution. Now the Revolution in Czechoslovakia is looked upon as part of history in many respects.



Today daily life has certain difficulties. Marxists experience the effects of industrialization, sickness, of unhappy and unanswered love, sometimes senseless death and killing. Sometimes it is easier to die in battle than in bed. Often you die enthusiastically on the battlefield. But I have not found any Marxist who on his deathbed was reading Marx's Das Kapital, or the writings of Lenin. That does not, of course, mean that we dismiss the writings of Marx and Lenin. But hundreds of thousands of people are realizing that they are not enough, that there is more to life than organization, politics, and certain views of history. Many times I have had the opportunity to talk to the so-called Aparatzik. When I talk to these people about the experience of Christmas, I always discover that there is a tremendous longing for that kind of experience. Even the toughest atheist discovers that to celebrate Christmas only with a special meal and with the visit of the mother-in-law is just not good enough. So we discover that the liberation of the working man which Marx stood for has certain other aspects.

Also, we have hundreds of thousands of Christian people in our country as well. The Marxist does not find detailed outlines of economics and political constructions of society in Christianity. But he finds, for instance in the Psalms, much which can help him to be in dialogue with his inner self. This does not happen overnight for everybody, but we certainly can say there are hundreds of thousands of atheists and Marxists for whom Christianity has become of interest. Fifteen years ago, most Marxists would agree that religion and Christianity are total nonsense and really the opiate of the people. I am a convinced atheist. But in spite of this fact, I had said already ten or twelve years




ago that religion is not all nonsense, that there is certainly an element of truth in it. Ten years ago my position was one as Isaiah describes it as "One crying in the wilderness." But in the so-called Prague Spring in 1968, there were hundreds of thousands of people who tried to get a new understanding of what the Christian Church stood for. Two or three years ago the question was raised like a flood, Why should we leave the Christian tradition only to the Christians? And why should not the atheists and Marxists try also to understand in a political way the treasure of Christianity?

Of course, most Christians do not take Biblical cosmology very seriously any more. But already on the second or third pages of the Bible you find the question, Where is your brother, Abel? Actually all ethics can be reduced to this question, Where is your brother, Abel? Communists had experiences, especially under Stalin, when this question was raised, even though he would not have put it in the same words--therefore the search for this contact, for dialogue, for cooperation. In Czechoslovakia it was not a once-a-year affair. Cooperation and working together on common topics and subjects in which both sides were interested was continuous.

Now the question can be raised, Why particularly Christians and Marxists? We have to be concerned also about dialogue with positivists, agnostics, and existentialists. We have to prepare ourselves for the dialogue with the Oriental cultures, Chinese, Hindu, etc. Fifty years from now maybe that dialogue between the Orient and the Occident may be the most important dialogue. Both of us in the so-called West and East are very poorly prepared for that kind of dialogue.

Most Czech theologians would emphasize that they have learned much from Marxists. For instance, the



historical-materialist methodology for radical orientation towards this world. Christianity is trying to get out of the philosophy influenced by Plato and, of course, by the Constantinian era. It is not a hopeless but a very difficult struggle.

My present task is to emphasize what we as Marxists can learn from Christians. We do not accept Christian ideology or a Christian world-view, which seems to be somewhat antiquated. And it is our view that much mythology is part of the Christian tradition. But mythology is not necessarily mythology, that is, it is not all negative. Greek mythology does not have the same value as, for instance, the value of the myth of the Exodus from Egypt and other mythologies in the Jewish tradition. We can learn from the Christians especially in respect to existential and so-called ultimate questions. Of course, the prophetic element is another one, too--the element of metanoia, which means repentance, and social turnabout. But Church history is full of examples of how not to do it. There was tension, for instance, between the Church theologian and the Church executive, and between the inquisitor and the heretic. All these things we really have taken over, unfortunately. Internal Christian problems have something to do with Marxism, and at the same time Marxist-Communist internal problems have something to do with religion and Christianity, especially when you think today of the struggle between Prague and Moscow. We can say that it is a struggle between the first country of the Reformation--as you know, a hundred years before the general Reformation, we had a reformation in Czechoslovakia--and a country which never really has had a reformation, the country of the Russian Orthodox Church. Many Russians simply cannot understand what it



means to have some initiative taken from below. This is a tragic fact for Czechoslovakia. And I would like to finish my brief talk with a question: Is this a Marxist or is this a Christian problem?

QUESTIONS

Question: Do you anticipate the possibility of some people embracing Marxism and Christianity simultaneously? Or is the atheist issue in Marxism so central that as with certain dissident groups in Christianity they no longer are recognizably Christian? Would not the Jewish-Marxist dialogue be a more logical dialogue than the Christian-Marxist dialogue?

Answer: Atheism is a negation, and one cannot continuously live with negation. Historically this negation plays a rather important role for Marxists. But in the last analysis, most Marxists have realized today that it is really not important what we do not believe but what we do believe. In certain respects it is really not our problem; it is a Christian problem. And I have to say that, if we see today how Christian theologians are fighting with each other to discover who God is and what He is, then I really do not know whether we Marxists are atheists. Marx opposed and negated certain models of the understanding of God as they existed in the 19th century. He was a radical critic in the time of Pius IX. and not in the time of John XXIII. It is not necessary to negate all models of God; for instance, the understanding of Bultmann and Rahner can be quite interesting to Marxists. And I would like just to summarize and conclude that historically it plays a certain role, but



not against God, but against certain models of God that were alive and presented in the 19th century. But the most important dogma of Marxism is not that there is no God. We have had no cosmic experience. The center of Marxist dogma is that man shall prevail, and that he shall live on the deepest possible level. In this way the question of atheism is really a secondary question. In respect to the Jewish-Marxist dialogue, whatever has been said about it is quite correct and logical, and we should not forget that Marx was very much influenced by Jewish tradition. It is not nonsense, as some people have said, that Marx was a type of Jewish prophet. Unfortunately, the same thing cannot be said of his successors. I have to say at the same time: there is the obvious fact that there are more Christians than Jewish people. Of course, in our small country, about 99 per cent of the Jewish people were exterminated under the German occupation. So either the Christians or Marxists today have to substitute for the Jewish tradition and also carry that tradition. I was once at a meeting where certain Christians and certain Marxists discussed aspects of the Israeli experience today. I said the Christians and Marxists have more in common. But one thing we both definitely have in common is the fact that we are both successful Jewish sects.

Question: What does the Marxist actually think of the Person of Jesus and His life?

Answer: I have not found a Marxist who has had no respect for Jesus. Even in the Stalinist period Christians were persecuted by Marxists not because they followed Jesus, but exactly because they did not follow Him. Of course, Marxists can have great respect and even adore Jesus as one of the most important people



who ever lived. The difference really then remains that for the Marxist Jesus is not God and not the center of history. There is no qualitative difference between Jesus and maybe five or six other great personalities in history. This is a basic difference, but this does not mean that we have to burn and destroy each other.

Question: Is there any indication, if it is not already happening, there will be a tripartite or a three-way dialogue between Jews, Marxists and the Christians?

Answer: Of course. Actually, we are all much too similar, too related; we are relatives. We hate each other sometimes the way brothers hate each other. And the foreigner who really does not relate to us is not quite as hated. I personally believe that the dialogue with the Indian and Chinese traditions will be much more difficult. But this is already an existential question simply because of the numbers of people and population in these countries. Marxism, Judaism, and Christianity really have the same roots in Western civilization. With Leibniz we could say there are actually only three forms of dynamic universalism. The Eastern religions know something about the adoration of the universe. But they really have no personal relationship either to the individual or the state or nation and country through this universal view of things, while in the Western religions this is the case and might somewhat explain our intolerance to others.

Question: Does an antagonism between Marxist and Communist parties exist in your country (Czechoslovakia) as I have found it to exist in Asia, and if it does, can you explain



it, and if it does not, can you explain it in Asia?

Answer: Of course, it is related but it is not the same; when we speak of Marxism, we really speak in theoretical terms--the theory of Marxism. When we speak of Communism or the Communist Party, we speak of an institution, or movement or party. And therefore there are some Communists who do not have a clue as to Marxist ideology and philosophy. We have Marxists who are only Marxists on Sunday, just as there are Sunday Christians. And then there are Marxists who are not organized communists. So we have really to differentiate between the kind of Marxism about which we are talking, whether Marxism related to Marx himself, or Marxism as it was developed by his successors, some of whom were not always geniuses. Among Marxists there are the sources of the early Marx, and then there are textbooks which are really unbelievable in their dogmatism. There is a certain analogy here if you compare the medieval scholasticism with the Sermon on the Mount. Both have something to do with Christian tradition, but it is not the same thing. Every great movement, unfortunately, has too many stupid people, and we are a rather large movement.

Question: Do you have any insights to share with us about the possible Maoist-Christian dialogue, or not, and secondly, what understanding do you have of the significance of the Christian understanding of forgiveness, of love of the enemy, of reconciliation, of non-violence and non-resistance?

Answer: Both are very important questions. I would like to talk about each of them for a whole afternoon. In a minute it is a rather difficult task. First of all, to the question of reconciliation and guilt and



humility, etc., viz. Augustinian categories. In the first and second stages of the development of Marxism as I have described it, these questions are of no interest at all. Marxism was very much influenced by Hegel, and Hegelianism was very different. There you really have a self-adoration and adulation of historical man, man as the center of things. Christians might understand the analogy of the expected parousia and the coming of Christ in the second century which did not take place in the way expected. First it had to be very clear to the Christian Church that Jesus was not coming as expected, immediately, and only then, after that was realized, were they willing to engage in a dialogue with the world of antiquity, and that means Stoicism, Platonism, etc. Many Europeans and Asian Marxists are still in that first century situation. Many of them still believe that the public ownership of the means of production will solve all problems. But this is only a question of time, and success and lack of success. One has to have patience. You cannot expect the same thing from the Chinese Marxists as from the Czech Marxists. In spite of this, I believe that Chinese Marxism has rather important elements which are not represented by Czech or Soviet Marxism. Two examples: the cultural revolution has brought much chaos and a lot of nonsensical behavior. But it could be compared to some extent to what has been called the Prague Spring, where we attempted not to let all the decisions be made by the bureaucrats. It is really a question of making the Revolution permanent, as Lenin and Trotsky wanted it to be, but this is just another way of saying: ecclesia semper reformanda, the Church is in constant need of reform. We constantly have to revolutionize ourselves.



Second example: one thing we have to take very seriously is that Marxism has won out in a country which did not have a Christian tradition, which is the first time that has happened. Obviously, something different will have to come out of that. In the West, I would say, formed by Western civilization, most Communists think that Communism means a totally secularized paradise. But the Confucian tradition does not know of this state of bliss, so the Chinese cannot use the same method of secularization with relationship to Marxism. Maybe the problem in the struggle between Peking and Moscow is that most Marxists do not know the history of theology. And Moscow thinks that whatever happens in Peking, in Prague, in Belgrade, is all a mistake. And how long did the same kind of judgment prevail in Rome! What we did in Prague again was really a premature Reformation. For the second time in history we have been premature. Our Reformation was one hundred years before Luther. We were terribly punished for that. But in spite of this fact we are rather proud that we are not like the people who always come late, three hours after midnight.

Question: How do you judge whether a particular action or event increases or decreases the potentiality for deeper human life?

Answer: That is one of the most difficult questions, and, as you know, not only for Marxists. In the last analysis, one has to make a very careful study of the situation and of man himself, and only then will one know what might help or hinder. Basically, it is a question of man's progress, and that not in external but internal terms. I am trying to develop acceptable



values from whatever source they might come, which is a very abstract way of putting it. The most important thing for Christians, the most decisive factor, is love of neighbor. Marxists have dealt for years and years with philosophy coming from Aristotle, Kant, etc. When they deal more with the art of Shakespeare and Schiller and Wagner, when they deal more with Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism, they still will not have a recipe for all actions. But the possibility that he might be able to do what is right is greater, and I think this is similar for the Christians. I do not believe that ignorance can help anyone.

Question: Having a detached view of the two camps (Americans and Communist Chinese), do you have any ideas as to some first steps that we can make or that they can make towards our moving closer together?

Answer: This is a very touchy subject, because I do not think a foreigner has a right to say anything directly on it. However, I certainly believe that the radical demonization of everything Chinese is radical nonsense, and can only end in tragedy.

CHARLES UNIVERSITY,  
PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA



Howard L. Parsons

"Lenin's Theory of Personality"\*

Lenin's theory of personality must be understood within the context of his theory of society and history. Following Marx, he saw individual personality as shaped and directed by the physical, biological, and social conditions of his body and his environment, all interacting in determinate ways. Individuality exists; it is evident to everyday observation. But we must not be misled by taking it as an ultimate fact. The ultimate facts are the facts of spatio-temporal, material nature and, in man's case, the facts of his social life and social production. These material things and events, however, are not given, fixed, and static. They are in continuous motion, interaction, change, and transformation. Lenin's viewpoint of nature, society, and personality is the viewpoint of dialectical materialism. This viewpoint is not a still picture. It is a dialectical method which engages the knower through practice in social struggle with the world of nature and with classes that stand over against him. Lenin's theory of personality was a reflection of his revolutionary social practice on the side of the working class and peasants against the ruling class of old Russia.

Such struggle is an inescapable feature of all persons living in class society. This struggle is a

\* Address delivered at the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria.



particular expression of the generic feature of every person to struggle in a creative way with his environment. A principle of unrest, of negativity, characterizes man as it characterizes all things.<sup>1</sup> In the case of man this unrest appears in the forms of specific needs and in the drive of man to move toward other persons and toward the non-human environment to explore that outer world interactively and to fulfill those needs. This is an arbitrary, spontaneous, necessary self-movement driving the individual toward his world.<sup>2</sup>

The unrest in man takes the form of "the purposive activity of man,"<sup>3</sup> or valuation toward a more or less imagined, conscious outcome. This factor is not philosophically stressed by Lenin, but it is presupposed throughout.

In his drive to live and to overcome the negativities within his body, the individual comes up against conditions which resist his action, which interlock and unite that action, and which negate and affirm it. He discovers a scarcity of food, of clothes, and of housing; other men who command and buy his labor power; and conditions of war, poverty, and the exploitation of one class of men by another class. These conditions of the Other, however, are not a pure or "empty" negation of man.<sup>4</sup> As objective, material conditions that exert their own power upon their own environments, they impinge upon man as material forces and in the form of sense data. They are mediated to man in the patterned reflections in his brain.<sup>5</sup>

Things and persons do not exist "in themselves," self-contained and autonomous, as in the models of



bourgeois thought from G. Leibniz to R. Nixon. Their very being is determination by others and their movement toward and against others, as, reciprocally, others move toward and against them.<sup>6</sup> Thus everything is interconnected, in transition, in process of being united and differentiated. Everything is mediated.

The world other than the individual man is mediated to him through his sense organs and his brain. Materially removed and unrecognized by man, the world of the Other is indeterminate for him (though determined for its affected environment). The moment that world affects man and is mediated to him, then it determines him: it opposes him, but it also unites with him. Man acts toward it with a specific purpose, and it accordingly is mediated to man through man's senses and the patterning of sense data in man's brain. The negation of man by the Other is thus not a vacuous negation but it is a negation that is in part determined by what man brings initially to it. The negation contains and preserves man's determination in some sense and reacts to man not only as opposite but also in unity.<sup>7</sup> Cognition brings man into a unitary relation with the Other.<sup>8</sup> Sense data and their patterns signify the qualities and relations, the character of the external, objective world. "Mechanical and chemical technique serves human ends just because its character (essence) consists in its being determined by external conditions (the laws of nature)."<sup>9</sup>

"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world"<sup>10</sup> that is prior to and independent of our perception. And the sensation provides the link between man and the external world, sensation is "the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness."<sup>11</sup> Such



transformation goes on repeatedly among us. At the same time this recapitulation of the external material in the brain in the form of sense data, images, forms, and relations is not merely passive reflection. Man's consciousness is active; it is in part a function of his purposiveness. Purposiveness is the drive of man transformed by the impact of events upon the organism, imparting to it sensations and patterns (ideas) of events. But the brain in turn transforms these transformations. Under the influence of need and vague purpose, it selects, emphasizes, and organizes the data induced in it. It creates hypotheses and imaginatively projects their consequences. This creation and projection is a function of purpose. ("Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it.")<sup>12</sup> But purpose in turn is a function of the dialectics of the human body with its total operative environment. Lenin had a theory of man's creativity, but that creativity is always determined.

Bourgeois theorists puzzle as to how Marxists can reconcile freedom and creativity with determinism. They presuppose a sharp dualism of freedom and determinism. But this dualism is a reflection of the antagonism between the individual worker, loosed from feudal ties and protection and "free" in the market, and the coercions of the capitalistic economy and state. (The alternative is the pessimism of mechanical materialism.) Similarly, ancient thought could extricate the individual from the coercions of slavery and empire (symbolized as the will of the gods, or blind fate) only by presupposing a dualistically separated "free" soul which has its reward in the after-world. The Marxist theoretical reconciliation of freedom and determinism is a guide to present action for overcoming the antagonism between



the capitalist, "free" in his wealth, power, and status but determined by the economy, and the worker, whose "freedom" to achieve the freedom of the capitalist is a sham both as a human value and a practical possibility within the determinations of monopoly capitalism.


Marxist theory is an anticipation of a society when all men will purposively determine their own genuinely human freedom (creative self-fulfillment) in association with the self-determining freedom of all other men on the planet.

For Lenin consciousness--as sensing and thinking--is only an intermediate phase in the dialectic of man with the world.

Unless to Thought is added Will,  
Apollo is an imbecile.

Man must fulfill his unrest, he must unite himself with an antagonistic world and overcome it, he must feed and clothe himself, he must negate poverty and war, the great negations of his species. The logic of man's life is to test his consciousness through practice.<sup>13</sup> Practice is the criterion of the objectivity of man's thought. Only then does the object emerge from its hidden and meaningless "in-itself" character and become "for-others." Only then does the notion become "for-itself,"<sup>14</sup> relevant to a man's and a class' purposes.

Thus for Lenin, as for Marx, man is a practical-critical being. He is also social; he is a member of a ruling class or a ruled class; he is engaged in a struggle to survive, and this struggle is concurrent with the class struggles going on throughout the world. Class struggle is an ultimate fact of all history thus far. Personality, creativity, and morality are all shaped by it. Insofar as man may choose sides in this struggle, the right side to choose is that of the



proletariat. "Our morality," wrote Lenin, "stems from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."<sup>15</sup> The reason for that choice is the drive of men to live and to fulfill themselves--not of the few, who own and exploit, but of the great mass of men who struggle against exploitation. That is a decision against the "accursed" maxim: "Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" and the rule: "All for each and each for all."<sup>16</sup>


For Lenin all men can be moral, altruistic, and creative in the highest human sense. But the fact is that they are not because of dehumanizing class systems. Hence the problem is to create a classless society. Then personalities can set about to become genuinely human beings. Bourgeois analysts put the problem the other way around. Conservatives claim that only the members of an elite are creative and that the mass of men do not matter; hence exploitative systems must be maintained and extended. Liberals claim that all men are potentially creative; hence bourgeois government (excluding the workers) must dispense "welfare", and so help men to realize their potential. Both views proceed from an identification with the interest of the ruling class and suppress awareness of the demands of the masses in the class struggle. Both views posit a fixed "human nature" independent of the class struggle. They thus blunt profound, revolutionary, truly human change.

For Lenin the class struggle is a necessary, essential part of man making his humanity. Men can collectively change and create their own history. The first step on this self-creation is the overthrow of the class system. After that men can then seriously begin to transform the old "human nature." This transformation cannot occur where men are exploited under a class system--even where half of the population of the



class society, as in the United States, has a high standard of living. This "middle class"-- a euphemism for a class of white-collar and blue-collar workers ambivalent about their role in the class struggle--is testimony to that. Here the high incidence of crime, delinquency, personality disorders, boredom, pleasure-seeking, drugs, and unhappiness show that the misery of feudal man and ancient enslaved man has not been overcome; it has only taken on a new form.

The critical difference is that Lenin stressed social struggle; the conservatives and liberals want to suppress, control, and balance the drive and struggle of the masses of men for creative, humanizing, social change. Lenin was a realist. "People have always been the foolish victims of deception and self-deception in politics," he wrote, "and they always will be until they learn to seek out the interests of some class or other behind all moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises."<sup>17</sup> Interest is a specific form of man's drive to live. It is shaped and directed by one's material and social situation. Personal interests arise within and are determined by social classes. All interests are interests of persons; thus a "class interest" is the summated interests of persons in a given class in defense of that class. The problem of revolutionizing practice, of class struggle on the part of the exploited class, is to bring into consciousness the real, human interests of the workers, to become consciously aware of class antagonism and class struggle, to develop a theory of revolutionary change, and to organize their power. For "the only effective force that compels change is popular revolutionary energy."<sup>18</sup> This energy must be materially



organized, disciplined, and directed by a revolutionary ideology.<sup>19</sup>

Lenin was a man of practice, and his theory reflected that emphasis on practice. Practice comes from interest, and it feeds, develops, and channels interest into habit. Lenin despised all that is impractical--abstract theory, phrase-mongering, sectarianism, opportunism, bureaucracy, inefficiency--not because he was a "pragmatist" but because practice is the way of testing the value of ideas in man's realization of his life. The impractical is the anti-human. Speaking of the cooperatives, he called for the participation of large masses, material support of the cooperatives, and "as little philosophizing and as few acrobatics as possible."<sup>20</sup> He thought that "living practice" was a way of "distracting the attention of both ourselves and our readers from the stinking bureaucratic and stinking intellectual Moscow (and, in general, Soviet bourgeois) atmosphere."<sup>21</sup>


As a man of unbounded interest and enthusiasm himself, he realized the importance of these elements in the lives of people and especially in revolutionary social change. To say that such change must be mass-based meant that it must be based on what is deepest in people--their drive to live, their love of life, and their enthusiasm for it. But this drive and enthusiasm must be sustained and rendered effective. That requires social organization. It requires "personal interest, personal incentive," and at one stage "business principles."<sup>22</sup>

Lenin believed that persons can and will free themselves from exploitative conditions and create a humane social order. "Life will assert itself."<sup>23</sup> This belief was confirmed by the success of the Bolshevik revolution and the building of socialism. But he did not




believe that any theory or any man was absolutely infallible. Marx's theory is not "completed and inviolable;" it is a general guide and must be applied differently to different situations.<sup>24</sup> To live and fulfill themselves, persons are compelled to plan both their private and social lives. But plans must be tried out in practice. Men must observe and reflect on their practice, correct and analyze the significance of their mistakes, and feed their corrections back into their plans and theories.<sup>25</sup> This dialectical unity of theory and practice is the only path of progress. Lenin did not hesitate to acknowledge the mistakes of the workers. He pointed out that after centuries of poverty, savagery, and ignorance, workers and peasants cannot be expected to create socialism flawlessly. And he spoke of the thousands of "great and heroic deeds" done by the toiling masses. "For the first time not the minority, not the rich alone, not only the educated, but the real masses, the vast majority of toilers are themselves building a new life, are deciding by their own experience the most difficult problems of socialist organization."<sup>26</sup> Here Lenin could point with pride to the living actions of masses which corresponded to his theory of personality and history.

Almost all professional theorists of human personality in the United States do not share Lenin's optimism about human personality and his militant belief in the efficacy of social action and the possibility of radical political change toward a human order of society for all. Their theories constitute a large variety of types: eclectic equilibrium theories (S. Lipset, T. Parsons), neo-Freudian theories (E. Erickson), behaviorism (B. Skinner), descriptive functionalism



(R. Merton), psychosocial theories (E. Fromm), field theories (K. Lewin), interpersonal theories (R. Bales), existentialism (R. May), self-actualization theories (G. Allport, A. Maslow), etc. These theories reduce to two general types: mechanistic, positivistic theories which by "naturalizing" personality dehumanize it and remove its valuation, purposiveness, drive toward unity, and creativity; and "humanistic" theories which stress the phenomenologically felt qualities and acts of personality but do not undertake to study the laws of mass conflict and progressively directed social change. The latter (humanistic) theories tend to be either individualistic or "other directed," depicting man as isolated in individual freedom or as absorbed into the local or national group. Neither set of theories faces the broad social conflicts and the class struggle.

Such theories of personality reflect the pluralism and fragmentation of American society. Their attention to surface rather than to depth, to individual behavior or experience rather than to social dynamics to immediate appearance rather than to underlying processes to existing structure of personality, role, and institution rather than to insurgent social transformation, to static details rather than to dissolving and developing patterns, to passive responsiveness and dependency on environment rather than to active and creative change, to individuality and other-directedness rather than to interactive and reconstructive relations of persons with other persons and with their world to isolated "facts" rather than to facts as means to man's values--such is a symptom that the theorists themselves have been determined and captured by the objects of their study and that the educators themselves need to be



educated.

The theorists have accommodated themselves to the values and demands of the ruling groups of a capitalist society. Not until 1940 did the American Journal of Sociology publish an article on the Nazi Party. An index of the Journal from 1895 to 1947 showed three listings under Marx or Marxism and no listings under Lenin or Leninism.<sup>27</sup> Yet American theorists of personality put forward their theories as if they were universally true, unaware that their descriptions of mechanical men eviscerated of power and purpose, of lonely individuals, and of other-directed, organization men are descriptions of crippled and sick personalities. Healthy theory develops when the theorist puts himself in touch with healthy actions, and revolutionary theory emerges when the theorist puts himself on the side of revolutionary forces among men.

Lenin was such a theorist. He observed and joined the struggle of Russian workers and peasants against the conditions of their oppression. His theory of personality was not contemplative, passive, and pessimistic. It was practical, active, and optimistic. That was not existentialism, creating a world out of the vacuum of its despair. It was a dialectical practice which endeavored to draw forth from the masses of men the objective collective, creative power within them in an objective situation demanding struggle, and in which practice and theory developed one another. Under the oppression of capitalism to say and theorize that man is mechanical, lonely, or dominated by society is to find confirmation in society as it is; such theory leaves things just as they are, and it is rewarded by the powers that be. But if one says and theorizes that the oppression must be, can be, and will



be transformed by the struggle of the masses, then the theory necessarily becomes an instrument of social practice. It is a hypothesis to be proved. And no one can prove it except the personalities of men in the mass. That is what Lenin meant when before the Revolution he called for mass struggle and when after it he wrote:

The local Soviets, depending on time and place, can amend, enlarge and add to the basic provision worked out by the government. Creative activity at the grass roots is the basic factor of the new public life....Socialism cannot be decreed from above. Its spirit rejects the mechanical, bureaucratic approach; living, creative socialism is the product of the masses themselves.<sup>28</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF BRIDGEPORT

Notes

1. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 38 Philosophical Notebooks. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, p. 113.
2. Ibid. p. 141.
3. Ibid. p. 188.
4. Ibid. p. 226.
5. V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952.
6. Philosophical Notebooks, p. 109.



7. Ibid., p. 226.
8. Ibid., p. 91.
9. Ibid., p. 188.
10. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, pp. 63-64.
11. Ibid., p. 44.
12. Philosophical Notebooks, p. 212.
13. Ibid., p. 202.
14. Ibid., p. 211.
15. V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues." In Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 291.
16. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, vol. 31, p. 124.
17. "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism." In Collected Works, vol. 19, p. 28.
18. Collected Works, vol. 23, p. 213.
19. V. I. Lenin, Against Revisionism and One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward.
20. V. I. Lenin, "On Cooperation." In Collected Works, vol. 33, pp. 469-470.
21. To N. Osinsky, April 12, 1922. In Collected Works, vol. 36, p. 579.
22. V. I. Lenin, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution." In Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 58.
23. V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder. New York: International Publishers, 1940, p. 81.
24. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 4, pp. 211-212.
25. V. I. Lenin, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution." In Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 59.
26. V. I. Lenin, "Letter to American Workers." In Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 72.
27. Hans Gerth and Saul Landau, "The Relevance of History to the Sociological Ethos", Studies on the Left, vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1959), pp. 11-12.



(135)

28. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 26, pp. 287-288.




Dobrin Spassov

"Refutation of Linguistic Philosophy"\*

I cannot see any logical objection to the application of the term "Linguistic Philosophy" to a broad tendency whose cohesion consists in considering language as the only place for finding philosophical problems or the grounds to solve them. Linguistic Philosophy thus conceived includes the following:  
(a) Logical Atomism which sees in the structure of language the key to the structure of the world; (b) Logical Positivism which reduces philosophy to the "logical syntax of language"; (c) Linguistic Analysis which explains philosophical misunderstandings by the confusion of different "language games", and which also tries to clarify "the actual use" of language;  
(d) Linguistic Transformationism which treats their "theory of language" as an epistemology.

The basic common feature of these trends is sociologically and psychologically rooted in the contemporary impossibility of returning directly to classical philosophical subjectivism, and, on the other hand, in the unwillingness of these philosophers to turn to a "metaphysical" (objective) reality. There is no difficulty in discovering in language the desired hybrid of the subjective and the objective, the only possible field of philosophical reasoning and generalization. Whatever its historical and social roots are, linguistic philosophy

\* Article abridged for this volume.



in all its varieties is a great theoretical mistake, an intolerable dislocation of the fundamental and the derivative.

The philosophy of linguistics can be neither linguistics about linguistics, nor meta-philosophy. It cannot be a third science existing in an imaginary domain between these two sciences. It is a manifestation in the specific sphere of linguistics of general philosophical theory; its raison d'être springs from a principle which is nowhere so broadly applied as in Marxist Philosophy. I am speaking of the unity of the general and the particular, the first existing in the second, as Lenin saw, as its "part or aspect or essence." That is why philosophical statements and categories can be converted into a philosophy of linguistics.

Here the general philosophical theory of relations is exceptionally important. The point is that almost all the definitions of language contain the words "means", "vehicle", "tool", or "instrument". True, their correlates, "aim", "purpose", etc., are psychological rather than philosophical categories. But from the most general point of view, the determination of something as a "means", etc., entails understanding them as terms of some relation. This is the basis of the paramount importance of the questions: In what relations does language participate? How should relations and relata be investigated?

I think the right approach here can be found under the slogan: neither opposition nor identification of relations and relata.

It is a fact, for example, that in the propositional form "a to the east of b" the range of suitable values of the term-variables (a and b) includes only



names of geographical places. This peculiarity of the possible relata is undoubtedly determined by the character of the relation. On the other hand, it is not less a fact that, in the propositional form "Bulgaria R Yugoslavia", words for geographical, historical, political, and cultural relations could be substituted properly for the relational variable R. In such a case, the peculiarities of the possible relations obviously depend on the nature of the relata. Therefore, the unity of relations and relata is not an empty phrase but a complete reality\*

Logical Atomism has been refuted on grounds similar to that of the refutation of epistemological representationalism. The logical atomists have been asked: if you


\* In view of all this, attempts to analyse the speech act, i.e. "the basic datum before linguistic investigation" (the immediate relation in which language participates), deserve special attention. The approach advanced by Gardiner and Bloomfield still bears a marked behavioristic color. The relational analysis inspired by this tradition and accomplished in the terms of "stimuli" and "reactions" considers the internal moments characteristic of linguistic communication insufficiently. Fewer philosophical objections would arise if one consistently took into consideration that it is people as speakers (writers) and listeners (readers) that receive stimuli and have reactions; it is people as thinking and feeling social beings that produce or perceive signs, and because of this recognize designata. It is people that make up the axis of linguistic communication. The usual definitions of language suggest its identification with symbols (sounds or written forms) as mediators between speakers and listeners. Of course, these material events are not language by themselves but links carrying out a definite function in a whole chain.



know the structure of facts independently of the structure of sentences, then why do you need the analysis of language as a means of solving classical philosophical problems? And if you hold that the existence of your own assertions alone are certain, then how do you know that these assertions picture the facts? Relational analysis of the speech situation could elaborate this criticism by bringing to light that language itself is impossible without the world, and that, among the relations in which it is interlaced, the human practical attitude occupies first priority. How is it possible to deduce the structure of facts from the structure of sentences, since the cognition of facts designated is a necessary condition for distinguishing between people that speak and people that merely make noise?

The refutation of Logical Positivism presupposes among other things the thesis that there are no purely syntactical words, that, consequently, pure syntactic constructions are not of a linguistic nature. This thesis could be defended as a corollary of the definition of language, according to which without the designatory function, graphic, and phonic materials could still remain, but there would be no linguistic facts. However, more concrete considerations are possible. If, for example, the word-combinations "both we and you", on the one hand, and "either we or you", on the other, are semantically different; if this were not due to their descriptive elements ("we" and "you"), which are identical in both cases, then we must assume (in spite of the authority of Russell and Carnap) that logical (syntactic) terms have a semantical content of their own.

What else, indeed, but old nominalistic spectacles



or philosophical blindness to the dialectic of relations and relata could prevent the naming of objective coexistence by "both...and..." and also the objective incompatibility by "either...or..."? Of course, the meaning of these conjunctions is not self-dependent. But will a realistic mind look for independence of relations in respect to relata? And does the dependence of relations entail their unreality? This is the reason why pure "logical syntax" could be a game with written forms, a calculus, or, suitably interpreted, a model at the service of some inquiry, but "logical syntax" in itself can be neither language nor philosophy.

Since the publication of The Meaning of Meaning (1938) the connection of symbol and referent was recognized to be an "imputed relation". And truly, there is no direct, dyadic relation of designation. Sign and designatum could for centuries stand face to face, they might or might not resemble one another; they might be causally connected or separated. No matter what they are, only the interpreter could introduce semantic relations between them as far as his perceiving of a sign constantly gives rise to his conceiving a designatum. All this could well be commonplace. But such a commonplace means that the semantic connection presupposes the more fundamental and more general epistemological relation neglected by linguistic philosophers. Epistemology is inseparable from ontology, since the admission of cognizability is impossible without the admission of existence.

On the basis of such an analysis, a criticism of ordinary language philosophy can also commence. Perhaps it is the tacit refusal to bring language and reality into correlation that is responsible for the identification of meaning and use, for "language games"



connected only by "family resemblances", and for setting ordinary speech against the philosophical "confusion of its rules".

The actual use of language is an historical phenomenon. As Maurice Cornforth remarks, even linguistic philosophers would be convinced of this if they were to become witch doctors in some primitive tribe. The combination of exalting the "actual use" of language and denying what is common in communication is a strange paradox. Without a basic, common character of signs and designata, no language is possible. What is a given word if nuances of its pronunciation and writing do not change it? Do not "individual" meanings slip out of the language-net woven into social life. Therefore, are not Hegel and Lenin right when they assume that language consists only of generalities?

No human treasure are buried in language. It does not live its own life. It is a generalized physical mediator of social beings. Language in itself contains neither thought, feeling, nor will. Its charm or ugliness, grandeur or meanness, are nothing but the charm, ugliness, grandeur, or meanness of man.


Perhaps from a linguistic point of view philosophizing transformationalism surpasses logical positivism and Oxford philosophy. I am thinking mainly of the transformationalist attempt to combine abstract formalism and empirical concreteness, language theory and separate language descriptions. But when some transformationalists declare that language theory itself belongs to epistemology, a philosophical protest must not be delayed. Analysis of linguistic communication shows that the unity of language and thought does not justify melting



them into a single event. People communicating are nowhere but in physical space; nothing but material facts could fulfill human linguistic connections.

Of course, "language" is a specific relational characteristic of sounds or written forms; it is their capacity of directing these same thoughts and turning them to the same objects, otherwise language could not be a tool of mutual understanding, of coordinating actions, a result and condition of human (i.e. social) life. But the necessary connection of language with psychological states and epistemological processes does not justify treating them as linguistic facts, and should not lead us to confuse linguistics with psychology and epistemology..

There are some points in language theory itself, which, critically examined, reveal the actual priority of philosophical considerations. Can the role of the "syntactic component" as an input of semantical and phonological components really not be illusory? Without taking into account thoughts and their "contents" is it possible to say that syntactical analysis deals with sentences? Without distinguishing characteristics and things characterized is it possible to discern elements of sentences? The confusion of real input and output in transformationalism can be seen in the fact that, contrary to the specific grammar, but in agreement with the epistemological approach to the matter, Katz repeats Chomsky's assertion that in "John is easy to please" "John" is the object, while in "John is eager to please" "John" is the subject of the sentence. True, sometimes linguistic philosophy realizes the real priority of ontological and epistemological problems, but in such cases it merely ceases to be linguistic philosophy. When, for example, R. M. Hare




declares, "One cannot study language in a philosophical way without studying the world that we are talking about", he actually crosses the borderline dividing linguistic philosophers and simply philosophers.

The refutation and self-refutation of linguistic philosophy will strengthen the view that the ground and scope of philosophical problems and solutions must not be confined within the narrow horizon of a separate special science. Philosophy remains an investigation of the most general features of all scientific fields.

Perhaps the most noticeable concrete achievement of this philosophical verbalism is the widespread linguistic treatment of logic. Correspondingly, one of the principal tasks of non-linguistic philosophy must be the reconquest of the fundamental logical problems.

I should like first of all to draw a distinction between the meanings of the expressions "interpretation of 'logic'" and "interpretation of logic". The first of them means nothing else but the clarification of the term "logic". As to the "interpretation of logic", it is possible only when logic itself is understood as a certain set of signs: such a conception is obviously engendered by the influence of linguistic philosophy. But is it correct?


One cannot merely take a generally accepted understanding of "logic", because there is no such generally accepted understanding. Nevertheless, the long chain of logical works - from Aristotle's Prior Analytics to contemporary meta-mathematics - suggests as a common assumption the truism that logic deals with logicality. One could also accept the statement that logicality is the necessary dependence of a given truth or falsehood on others.



But what are these "logical values"? How are they connected? If they are properties, what is their substratum? Answers to such questions furnish the dividing line between philosophically different conceptions of logic.

Logicians usually assert that truth and falsehood are properties of propositions. Their incompatibility in one and the same proposition is treated as the most fundamental logical relation, which if neglected leads one to fall into contradiction. Perhaps even logical necessity is, so to speak, a theoretical superstructure of non-contradiction. It is necessary to recognize (under the threat of contradiction) that the truth of a given assertion follows from the truth of others. Of course, non-contradiction, inadmissibility of joining "a" and "non-a", is not an ultimate datum. But it can hardly be explained if we speak of two possible properties of one and the same proposition. In my opinion, it is far more natural to admit that "a" and "non-a" are different assertions which refer to incompatible objects. Is it strange, indeed, to think that "non-a" means, at first, not that "a" is not true, but that "non-a" is true? Thus we avoid the doubling of "logical values"; we explain non-contradiction not by a vicious circle - the incompatibility of truth and non-truth--but by an objective relation. (We could set forth the foundation of negation and define logic in terms of truth.)

Propositions can be conceived in three different ways, at least. Its name could mean: first, a certain objective situation; second, a thought, a judgment about this objective situation; and, third, the sentence or the sign that expresses the thought and designates the objective situation.



It is clear that proposition in the first sense of the word must be rejected as a candidate for the substratum of truth. The contents we are aware of could be real or unreal, but they can never be true or untrue. And so we have to decide: where is truth? In the propositional judgment, in the thought, or in the propositional sentence or sign?

Some will say, it is only the thought that can be true. But we attribute this value to the sign on the basis of a certain correspondence between it and the thought for the sake of easier manipulation; otherwise how will the logical calculus be possible?

On their part, others declare: taking into account the inseparable connection of thinking and language, it will not be a great mistake if we say that linguistic phenomena or, in general, signs are the upholders of truth. Does the sign possess its truth? Signs by themselves are always physical facts: sounds or written forms, little knots, bank-notes. But as I have already tried to show, the physical nature of such things is far from being a sufficient reason to call them signs: the sign is their relational property; it presupposes something else.

From Locke's days up to now attempts have been made to clarify this "something else" by means of understanding designation as a dyadic relation: a given phenomenon is a sign if there is another thing - its designatum. That is all.


Let us consider in abstraction different pairs composed of signs and their designata. Under this condition it is impossible to determine the designation. While signs vary within the limits of the perceptible physical facts, designata are almost



beyond every limit: they could be things, properties, relations. There is somewhere a causal connection between sign and designata, somewhere a resemblance catches the eye. According to Peirce's terminology, it has to do with "indexical signs" in the first case, and with "icons" - in the second. But with "symbols" neither causality nor resemblance is necessary. Then what is designation in general?

Designation is found to be indeterminable in abstraction from people or, in general, from some living beings. Signs turn out to be not only designating something but always designating something to somebody. More exactly speaking, the function of the sign consists in the following: while perceiving it, the living being, on the basis of some association, refers to a determinate object. That is why the function of a sign as a substitute is sometimes emphasized. But for our task it is more important to stress that designation is accomplished by means of the pragmatic relation of sign and interpreter and the epistemological relation of interpreter to the designated object. So where is that truth which by itself has an obviously relational nature?

Some "philosophical" syntacticians are convinced that it is possible to define truth in terms of relations of signs, without going beyond the sign-member of designation. But it is well known that the necessary truth, for example, of the assertion, "Jack is a bachelor because he is unmarried", is reducible to the empirical fact that the words "bachelor" and "unmarried man" designate one and the same thing. Only in this respect (referring to the designatum) could they be substituted each for the other.




As far as a given syntactical link is in fact connected with truth, it is completely reducible to the pragmatic relation of people to different signs as determining the epistemological relation to one and the same object.

Thus we again approach the contention that truth is a semantical property of a sign. And I shall stress once more that there is no semantical relation as a direct link of the two things. The sign designates a determinate object only as far as perceiving the sign calls forth the conceiving of that object. This is an invariable situation. But if so, where is the root of the difference between truth and falsehood? What does it consist in?

It is impossible to answer such a question in abstraction from the epistemological relation to the object. In general we must reject the claims of the sign to be the upholder of truth. Nothing is left to us but to search for the truth in the subject, in the interpreter of designation, to search for it in his cognitive relation towards the external world. One could ask in this connection: is it not possible for truth to be, in an indirect way, a property of the sign too, so far as the latter is a sign only in a determinate connection with human thinking? But there is no reason for assuming that the characteristics of a given thing which is necessarily connected with another are characteristics of this second thing too. A linguistic sign, for example, is necessarily connected also with human brains, organs of speech, etc.


The problem of knowledge as a problem of the relationship between the subject and the object is



a complex one. We can approach it sociologically, by trying to explain the direction of knowledge by means of human activity, which, in turn, is determined by our position in the system of social relations. Further, it is possible to investigate knowledge as a psychological fact, as a function of personality. It is possible to reveal its physiological aspect as well, and sometimes, for instance in the case of the visual perception, it is very useful to study the external, physical conditions of knowledge..

But the problem of truth is always connected with the question of the object known. Is it or is it not a reality independent of the process of knowing it? Acknowledgment of truth is possible only after we can answer this question in the affirmative. Truth is possible only if there is such a "content of our ideas which is independent of man and mankind" (Lenin). This statement is in accordance with the most widespread human conviction that serving truth means revealing real situations, regardless of one's own or somebody else's subjective preferences. Thus the problem of truth turns out to be inseparably connected with the classical philosophical questions of the nature of the date of experience, of appearance and reality, of the importance of practice for knowledge, and so on.


Since assuming knowledge means assuming the existence of its object, while assuming objective reality presupposes acknowledgment of its cognizability, the recognition of truth is simultaneously an ontological and an epistemological question. That is why, in Marxist philosophy, ontology and epistemology are



treated as two inseparable aspects of fundamental philosophical theory. So, there is a sound way of advancing logic from the bounds of semiotics and linguistics to materialistic philosophy. But how can we build the edifice of this "ontological-epistemological" logic without disregarding the achievement of logicians who have advanced it even without suspecting its existence? I have already emphasized the significance of non-contradiction for the explanation of logicality. Now I can say more firmly that the understanding of the incompatibility of propositions in respect to their truth presupposes, first, accepting that they are thoughts, and second revealing the objective contents that make the given propositions incompatible. The determining point here is the existence, if not of incompatible, then at least of disparate, objects.

Since "objects" constitute the end-point in the explanation of logicality, it becomes possible to place them into the theoretical foundation of logic. Maybe the term "object" is too ambiguous to serve as a solid ground of such an exact science. This term is, infinitely multi-significant; on the basis of its universal meaning, it can be specified as sign, as thought, as a concrete external thing, or as a class of objects: generally speaking, as everything that exists independently of the process of knowing.

Let us designate the object with "a". In such a case the object incompatible with "a" can be designated with "non-a" ( $\bar{a}$ ). The properties of the relation of incompatibility which underlie non-contradiction and other analogous relations could be designated with the well-known formulae:




a. $\bar{a}$ , a V  $\bar{a}$


The first of them may be interpreted equally as incompatibility of truth and falsehood in thought, incompatibility of class and complementary class, etc. All these possibilities are due/not to the alleged emptiness of the formulae in question but to the extremely general content designated by means of them.

Philosophical logic will succeed in approaching the problem of conjunction, disjunction, implication, equivalence, and negation, which are the basis for the linguistic conquest of the logical investigations. There is no profound reason to think that the logical connectives are purely verbal facts or facts peculiar only to thinking. Is there not, for instance, an obvious analogy between the disjunctive proposition and the parallel set of relays or the sum of two classes of things? I am convinced that the preference of four out of sixteen mathematically possible combinations of two propositional variables under two values of every variable could be explained only by the "logic of the objects". The semantics of ordinary language is powerless to solve this problem because there is no complete coincidence of meaning between the signs of conjunction, disjunction, implication, and equivalence, on the one hand, and the corresponding connectives "and", "or", "if...then...", "if and only if...", on the other. (The conventionalistic solution of this difficulty also does not elucidate the special applicability of these connectives in comparison with the others.)

But it is quite another thing to approach the problem on the ground of the possible combinations of two objects and their negations (by "negation"



I understand every member of every incompatibility in respect to the other member of this relation). For example such a scheme



makes it possible to explain why it is the conjunction, the disjunction, the implication, and the equivalence that deserve special attention. It is possible to exemplify the objective content of the conjunction with student-sportsmanship which is absent in students not being sportsmen, in sportsmen not being students, and when there are neither students nor sportsmen. Further, it is possible to illustrate the implication with the relations of the type of the tragic marriage of man and mortality, or equivalence with every one-one relation, in short, the materialistic "translation" of the logical values defining the typical molecular propositions explains which of them have specific objective content and, consequently, specific logical significance:  $a.b; a.bV\bar{a}.b; a.bV\bar{a}.b$ ; and  $a.b V \bar{a}.\bar{b}$  (cf. the corresponding sectors of the geometrical model).

At any rate, it is far from obligatory to think that the problem under consideration is monopolized by the so-called logic of statement-connections.. It could be treated as a problem of determinate objective relations which are the common essence of molecular statements and the corresponding points of Class Logic, Technical Logic, and so on.

In an analogous way we could approach the



abundance of logical laws cultivated by Symbolic Logic. Since they are true for all the combinations of the values of their elements, they allude to all the combinations of the corresponding objects. We could establish, for example, that the designatum of the analytical formulae containing two variables is the logical sum:

$$a.b. \vee a.\bar{b} \vee \bar{a}.b \vee \bar{a}.\bar{b};$$

under three variables we have:

$$\begin{aligned} & a.b.c \vee a.b.\bar{c} \vee a.\bar{b}.c \vee a.\bar{b}.\bar{c} \vee \bar{a}.b.c \vee \bar{a}.b.\bar{c} \\ & \bar{a}.b.c \end{aligned}$$

and so on.

It is possible to explain the reducibility of all analytical formulae to the designation of the relation of incompatibility detailed to different degrees. This fact is the foundation of the well-known possibility of reducing all the Laws of symbolic logic to the Law of Excluded Middle as the shortest representation of their "normal disjunctive form". (When admiring the so-called free logical constructions, we must not forget that they differ in elegance, acquire the splendor of truth, and the power of practical application, only as much as they are built on the ground of the simple logic of objects.) Written forms are the most suitable means for constructing models in aiding investigation of abstract, objective relations. But from a general logical point of view, signs are the means and not the objects of investigation.

I tried to demonstrate that linguistic philosophy can neither abolish ontology and epistemology, nor deliver logic from traditional philosophical problems. This failure is deeply rooted in the very nature of the relations between philosophy and the special sciences.




One of the queerest features of contemporary philosophical life is the growing willingness of philosophers and scientists to turn their tables. This tendency by itself is neither a plus nor a minus. Aside from the philosophical snobs' flirtation with mathematics, cybernetics, and so on, the movement from philosophy to the special sciences is completely justifiable: it is a natural way of accomplishing the cultural function of philosophical knowledge. That is why the many contemporary philosophies of the various sciences must be greeted, provided these philosophies are applications and not dissolutions of the one, unified philosophy. As for the opposite movement, that is somewhat different. Undoubtedly, it can express the legitimate desire of the scientist to clarify the theoretical foundations of the special sciences; it can result as well in the correction of some philosophical generalizations. But when a separate special investigation pretends to be the substitute for, or the point of departure of philosophical knowledge, our protest must not be delayed: such a positivistic pretension neglects the real relation of theoretical problems, and besides it removes practice from its basic position. The ground for the refutation of every kind of positivism can easily be found, for example, in Lenin's criticism of so-called physical idealism. Lenin emphasized that the transformation of physical concepts need not necessarily result in new fundamental philosophical statements. This is so because philosophy has a wider scope and a more general content than physics (or any other special science). Philosophical generalizations must be founded on all of history and the totality of human



knowledge. And as for the basic problem of objective reality or objective truth, seeking solutions in the sciences leads one to fall into an obvious vicious circle. That is why Marxist Philosophy includes practice in epistemology. (Of course, a definite scientific discovery can abolish a given statement of philosophy, but can never replace it by another philosophical generalization.)

In conclusion, I cannot conceive of man-in-general somewhere outside of actual people. But suppose I know only a single human being? Shall I be able to discriminate his human essence from his individual peculiarity? Of course I shan't, because every generalization presupposes the comparison of many particular cases. The universalization, furthermore, always bears a risk. That is why the movement from philosophy to a separate special science is logically sounder than the opposite movement. For example, the features of man in general are my features as well, but my own traits do not necessarily characterize man in general. So linguistic philosophy must not be defended, even as a mere philosophical generalization of linguistic facts. Linguistic philosophy is inadmissible to everybody who understands the real nature of the unity between universal and particular, between philosophy and science.

Linguistic philosophy cannot be accepted by anyone who realizes that language is neither the only nor the fundamental reality, and consequently, linguistics is neither the only nor the fundamental science.



Igor Hrušovský

"Being and Structure"\*

The question of objective existence in-itself, of the existence of reality in-itself, of the independence of being from consciousness, is an epistemological question. The reifying of fully determinate and hence "characterized" entities, i.e. of empirical objects or facts, implies that they occupy a definite position in a given system. The question of Being in-itself, i.e. of the transcendence of the uncharacterized cosmic totality, can only be posed in terms of the epistemological polarity of objective being--subjective consciousness.

What leads one to accept the transcendence of being? To put it succinctly: analysis, confrontation, the organization of the data of consciousness, experience, praxis, all provide answers to the question of whether these data, quite apart from their subjective component, testify to Being beyond the limits of consciousness or hint at an independent reality beyond the immanent world of conscious experience.

Our acceptance of the transcendence of being makes it easier for us to interpret and systematize the data of individual consciousness. Our concrete picture of the world gains further depth from the cognitive experience of others. Hence, I have an empirical as well as a practical basis for preferring the hypothesis of realism to that of solipsism.

\* Translated from German by John C. Cullen.



Of course, I can have identical experiences in a conscious state and in a dream. But once I have become aware of the origin of such dreams, I know perfectly well that I am dealing with a mere dream-reality. Furthermore, we are familiar with the occurrence of group hallucinations; and therefore even collective convictions must be accepted with reservations, and consistently with the totality of our systematically ordered experiences. During the early stages of human evolution, the conditions of human life were enormously oppressive and a source of bitter disappointment and emotional upheaval for the individual. Accordingly, the human subject began to separate itself off from the uncompromising object. In a similar way, the child begins to distinguish his own ego from external reality, once the awareness dawns that objects continually frustrate his will.


Philosophically, the problem of the transcendence of Being must be kept separate from that of its nature. In principle, the epistemological question of Being-in-itself (the existential referent), i.e. the question of the existential independence of the objective world from consciousness, must be distinguished from the ontological question about the determination of being by means of philosophical categories. Consequently, the existential nature of the object must be distinguished in principle from the empirical question. Independently existing reality is in no sense formless. A completely chaotic reality would remain incomprehensible to the knower.. The specific reality of the object is expressed through its structural and dialectical relationships. The qualitative specification of each object is determined by the concrete character of its inner structural



articulation, along with its essential external relationships. If we want to know what a particular object or event is, we must direct our attention to its characteristic structural features. In the final analysis, the whole world in-itself is a system of relationships and oppositions in every variety and form. Every object that exists can be understood or conceived only on the basis of the reciprocal relationships of its components and its total context of time-space conditions. These relations alone are rationally, discursively, cognitively, and intellectually conceivable.

The intellect is, of course, the organ that comprehends relations, connections, and functions. Empirical categories express in a specific manner the structural, functional, dynamic, and dialectical relations of the actual. Intellectually, we can grasp the structure of reality with constantly greater articulateness and adequacy, and our expression of its various forms can become indefinitely more exhaustive and relevant; but we still remain always within the limits of a particular network of conceptual relationships.

Though knowledge undoubtedly starts from the intuitive material transmitted by the senses, it reproduces objective reality not in an unmediated way but abstractly. It is worth noting that science forsakes its sensuous [anschaulichen] character more and more in its theoretical phases, and develops in complete abstraction from the levels of sensory phenomena. Nevertheless, modern science expresses the profoundly dynamic structure of the world much more adequately than any of those immediate [anschaulichen] forms of cognition which are suited



only to grasping the surface reality of experience. Thus, any attempt to grasp an actual fact without conceptual tools is unthinkable, since it will then unavoidably appear not as fact but merely as perceptual experience. Only if I can analyze it conceptually (i.e. apperceive it) will its empirical content be made clear. But to ignore the epistemological problem runs the risk of reifying or objectifying sensory experience. Philosophy has only gradually freed itself of this snare.

When we want to denote the dialectical unity of those basic features of the object which give it its relative permanence and its distinctness from other objects, and, at the same time, when we wish to distinguish this unity from mere sensory qualities, we are speaking of the category of quality. Thus, every quality is the expression of the specific character of a definite object, it expresses its lawful composition, i.e. the system or structure of its internal relations and of those laws that are necessary to explain its status as an object. Of course, the various qualitative determinations of the cosmic whole intermingle and modify one another in innumerable ways. Objects and facts are only the relatively constant nodal points of the reciprocal and conflicting activities of a reality qualitatively infinite and manifold. No objects, and none of their basic characteristics, are completely isolated from still more fundamental determinations; they are never fully defined simply in terms of themselves. However, any act of cognition is relational, since only a fully rational relationship is one which is logically grounded. Many philosophers are of the opinion that the components or relata cannot themselves be



grasped by means of the relation, and hence are indefinable. Still, knowledge is relational, and our concepts grasp the several regions of objective reality in their specific structural or systematic configuration in a rational manner, more or less adequately.


What we at any time treat as unanalyzable components (and thus as the most fundamental elements of a given concrete substance) in the course of scientific development always turn out to be structurally differentiated. If I may cite the testimony of the physicist Weisskopf, high-energy physics has shown that protons and neutrons have a definite structure, and that the nucleus is not as simple as once appeared. This structure and the internal dynamics of the nucleus reveal quite unexpected and novel features, which structurally have little in common with the entities known up to this time. The dialectic of scientific development proves that there is no ultimate substance in objective reality. This means that when we speak of the fundamental (and thus undifferentiated) elements of a concrete object, we speak only from the standpoint of a definite substantial level, hence, of only relatively stable elements. The properties of the element are functionally related to a physical point of departure, which itself is determined by the dialectico-structural organization.

As praxis makes clear, there is a dialectical correspondence between any conceptual system of empirical cognition, and the empirical reality itself. It is more and more apparent that we must distinguish between the metaphysical and empirico-structural way of conceiving substance. As the history of scientific

1.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  2.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
3.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  4.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
5.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  6.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
7.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  8.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
9.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  10.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
11.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  12.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
13.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  14.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
15.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  16.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
17.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  18.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
19.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  20.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
21.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  22.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
23.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  24.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
25.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  26.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
27.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  28.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$   
29.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  30.  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$

knowledge shows, our conceptual reproduction of objective reality is constantly gaining in adequacy, even while remaining specific and merely approximate. The question of metaphysical substance must be recast as an issue involving concrete relationships. In science it is pointless to speak of the concept of any other ontological substance than the empirico-structural. Substance is the structure of the constitutive concrete relationships of the object. The substance of an object is the product of its fundamental aspects and components, the unity of their reciprocal relationships. Substantial categories, as for example, thing, body, element, etc., cannot be conceived apart from attributive categories which express the characteristic properties of the actual object. Attributive categories constitute the content of substantial categories, they give them concreteness.

The ontological nature of reality is comprehensible only through empirical predicates. The character of reality can be grasped in its proper specificity (even though never fully exhaustively) through the cognitive techniques of empirical science. In my work Probleme der Noetik (1948), I drew attention to the fact that, so far as empirical reality is concerned, it is at least as differentiated as the regions of empirical knowledge. In confirmation of this assertion, the Czech philosopher J. L. Fischer goes even further, insisting that the scope of objective differentiation is indefinitely wider than we can ever do justice to in our acts of knowing. We presume that it is this fact which underlies the development and continual radicalization of empirical science. What does Being-in-itself, Being in general mean? We can



answer this question only in terms of the epistemological relationship knowledge-being. In ontology, no less than in the particular sciences whose object is the comprehension of the character, properties, and laws of objective reality, there is simply no other knowledge than the empirico-structural. As Carnap so aptly expressed it, the propositions of trans-empirical metaphysics have no cognitive meaning whatsoever.

Objective reality as a whole is coextensive with the structure of the universe. Its components are reciprocally interconnected in relationships of contradiction, as are the categories of philosophy. The determination of each category is defined by its relation to all other categories. Philosophical categories express the most basic and universal aspects of reality as a whole. Each category reflects a definite, particular aspect of the universe. In the hierarchy of the total system of knowledge, philosophy represents a high point, since it conceptually reproduces reality as a whole. This means that in a scientific philosophy all relations and interconnections are internal. The total perspective makes itself felt even when we (as philosophers) are investigating only a particular segment of reality.

At any given level of universality in our knowledge, we can be pursuing either philosophy or some regional science, depending on whether we take as our goal the deeper penetration of a philosophical problem on the basis of some regionally restricted discipline or a particular scientific problem in terms of philosophical categories.

Ontology as a philosophical discipline, i.e. as the universal science of the universal character of Being, worked out on the basis of the most universal



philosophical categories, can be no different, in principle, from those regional sciences which have as their object the characterization of qualitatively limited Being. Philosophy and the special sciences together represent the total structure of knowledge. External, independent reality is the source of all concrete cognition. We grasp the proper, immanent character of objective reality with the specialized tools of knowledge in the course of the endlessly self-correcting process of science. During the process, we discover, from time to time, new features of objective reality, forms of being to which we had never given our attention.

Since the ontological richness of objective reality can never be exhaustively and definitively translated into cognitive and discursive categories, the validity of empirical statements must always have a probabilistic character. It can be stated with perfect justice, that, as a result of the noetic inexhaustibility of the objective properties of reality, our acts of cognition are always open-ended. Some thinkers would distinguish philosophy from science precisely on the grounds that philosophy's problems are never completely solved. But this is equally true of science. (We are, of course, concerned in both cases with statements about objective reality, not with the analytic propositions of logic or mathematics.)

We never know the objects of the external world in their original, unmediated form, and so empirical knowledge mirrors reality only in a merely specific way, i.e. concrete acts of empirical cognition correspond in specific ways to empirical reality. Whatever the degree of adequacy of this correspondence,



we achieve it by praxis, by scientific experiment, and by the steady accretion of knowledge. There is probably no need to recall here that, beneath the surface of empirical reality, we assume an indefinite terrain over which we only gradually achieve mastery, which we hope to reach through all the complex, dialectical turns of empirical knowledge.

As we have seen, the level of our concrete acts of knowing is sufficiently high to serve as an adequate pre-condition for integral experience. It must be adequate, if science is to come into a constantly more complete and comprehensive possession of actual facts. Even though with every critical advance in science we have to keep revising even those fundamental theories which presumably hint at the truth about empirical reality, nevertheless we are coming closer and closer to an adequate knowledge of the world.

When I assert that external reality is the ultimate source of all concrete knowledge, I mean to imply that the dialectical process of knowledge, praxis, transforms this reality, gaining a gradual articulation of the "thing-in-itself," making it a "thing-for-us", i.e. into an object that can be cognitively grasped. Being as such, i.e. the "thing-in-itself", has no determination whatsoever, and on that account, can have no conceptual correlate. The object, which we gradually assimilate in the course of the cognitive process, acquires first of all the attribute of materiality. Time and space determinations apply from the outset to the empirical world, to the qualitative level of Being, matter; not however, to Being as such.


Matter is the philosophical category which designates the totality of empirical reality. In the early stages



of the history of knowledge, we attach the label materiarity to whatever it is which gives rise to our unfolding empirical knowledge. The ontology of naive realism is identical with the way things appear. In the process of scientific abstraction the human subject gradually detaches itself from the concrete objects of perception and grasps empirical facts (material objects), e.g. according to the non-sensuous models of micro-particles, which, nevertheless, do have an effect upon us and upon the physicist's instruments.

A structure is a composite whose elements and components preserve an equilibrium in accordance with a definite law of reciprocal interrelations and oppositions. As far as two terms structure and system are concerned, many philosophers hold that they are synonymous, while others make a distinction between them. Personally, it has been my opinion for several years now that it would be best to reserve the concept system for ideal or notional systems; and use structure for the material object-in-itself. Nonetheless, material structures might be treated as systems, if the elements of the system were taken to represent the essential features of the structure. Research into the structure of the material object can easily suggest the construction of a system, or the systematizing of the object in such a way that we line up in systematic order those special features of the object we take to be essential at any given qualitative level.

The properties of a definite, significant, and essential component or segment of an object are determined not only by the componental function, i.e. immanently, but in a special way by the total structural



unity. This holds also vice versa of the components in determining the character of the totality in question. If the alteration of a component has a transforming effect on the other components, as well as on the structure of the whole, then it is an essential component in the full sense. A structural component which is also essential fulfills a definite function in the totality, one that is co-determined both by the qualitative peculiarity of the component itself and by the totality. Therefore, the specific features of a particular component are brought out by their functional relationship to a given whole. Consequently, the functions of the various structural components reciprocally influence and condition one another; for example, the functions of the same chemical compound are quite different in their non-biological (i.e. chemical) and their biological (i.e. biochemical) structures.

We can further assert that the privileged position of the whole in relation to the parts is only a relative and conditional one. The specific character of every objective whole is in this way fully dependent both upon its components and their functions, and upon their characteristic structural composition.

But this picture of harmony in the world structure needs to be completed by a look at its less harmonious side. Objects are only relatively stable, and there are no definitive and unchanging essences. Thus, we speak of a dynamic, rather than a static stability of structure. In this connection, the well-known theoretical biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, employs the phrase, "the fluid equilibrium of an open system". Such a dynamic stability of equilibrium is conditioned both by the dialectical composition of the structure



and by the various functions and processes.

The most important factor in every essential change of qualitative transformation of the real object is its inner tension of opposing forces. The unity of the immanently opposed properties of the object expresses its structure from the standpoint of the changes it can undergo, its organization, its inner dynamics, perhaps even its developmental history. Such, in brief outline, is what a dialectico-structural interpretation of the essence of an object might look like.

A special problem for the dialectico-structural approach to objective reality is presented by the open system, i.e. one which interchanges matter and energy with its environment for the purpose of self-regulation. The example here, par excellence, is the living organism.

I should like now to make some attempt to work out a definition of the concept of structure. Through this concept we express the unity of lawful relations, functions, causal, and dialectical interconnections of the object, i.e. the unity in the midst of its inner complexity. The concept of structure is therefore the expression of the contradictory unity of the necessary and thus essential relations and laws of the object, and not of a merely mechanistic grouping of laws. The specific character of the object, its structure, is not the result of its separate features taken in isolation from one another, but of their functional and reciprocal contradictory unity. The whole is in no sense the mere sum of its parts, but has, besides, specific, integrating properties. According to Bertalanffy, problems of highly variable interaction, of organization, of hierarchical arrangement, of differentiation, of counter-entropic tendencies, of



goal-directed processes, demand conceptual instruments that are appropriately specific, not merely the tools of physical science.

It is often asserted that structure is an inherent property of material reality, i.e. of the empirical object. But we should not let it escape our notice that alongside the material there are also mental structures, i.e. ideological and theoretical ones. Theoretical structures grow out of and underlie developmental changes in a dialectical interplay of theory and praxis, of theoretical and material structures.

Analogously, though in a specifically quite different way, we may speak of the aesthetic attitude to reality. Speaking of the aesthetic attitude to reality, it is quite clear that dominant aesthetic values and norms are structures. They are conditioned by time and class, they are contemporary, they exist in a social community, and they are changeable. Every artistic product must have the basic capacity to stimulate an immaterial, aesthetic correlate in the subject. Aesthetically we speak quite naturally of coming in contact with reality purely and simply, for in relating ourselves to artistic reality it is precisely this aesthetic dimension in the contact which is dominant, and which simply overwhelms the other functions.

In my book Engels as a Philosopher (1946), I worked out the following formulation: the whole world is a system of real relations, which reciprocally inter-penetrate, are organically interconnected; and which, further, interact in a definite and specific way anytime a particular change takes place or a particular phenomenon is to arise or disappear. The world which presents itself as a dynamic structure is a network of permanent potentialities, all with manifold, fluctuating

$\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial p} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial q} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \dot{p}} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \dot{q}} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \ddot{x}} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \ddot{p}} \right) =$   
 $\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \ddot{q}} \right) =$

$\frac{d}{dt} =$

intensities and forms. Actual reality is thus a structure of interconnections and conditions, i.e. a dynamic structure, pregnant with movement and dialectical tension, in which the various concrete phenomena continually change, arise, and disappear. Objective reality, whether looked at in terms of its structure or its variety and changeability, has no absolute boundaries. For this reason, an adequate grasp of an actual event is possible only by taking into consideration the entire complex network of reciprocal relations among the separate components of reality.

Furthermore, the well-known physicist, D. Bohm, recently stated in this connection that objects cannot be treated as things having an independent existence at any moment. There is a reciprocal interpenetration and fluctuation even among the qualities of the existing thing. If the internal and external relations and contradictions within each object, event, process, and development interpenetrate, reinforce, and interweave with one another, even this immanent, inner dialectic is not to be taken as absolute and cut off from the dialectic of external objects. It is linked to them in any number of lawful ways on a higher level. The inner dialectic of a definite, concrete phenomenon is, therefore, only relatively independent and immanent. In the final analysis, the same kind of immanent dialectic is found at the level of the superstructure as we just now observed within the narrow bounds of individual structures.

In my book, Strukturation und Apperzeption des Konkreten (1966), I particularly emphasized that it was illegitimate to make absolutes out of the external (heteronomous) and the internal interconnections and relations of components and structures. A more narrowly limited structure (e.g. an organ of the human body).



can be distinguished from a more broadly determined one (e.g. the human organism as a whole) only in a relative sense. In the first place, the organ in question, its function, and its self-development are all internally determined by a specific, dialectical principle, in terms of which the organ is conditioned and stimulated by external relationships. In this way, the outer environment indirectly determines and modifies the qualitative status of the particular organ or object. The several regions of actual being are, therefore, never completely autonomous. Every sphere of reality (e.g. in the cultural area) is interrelated with every other structure in the total, cultural superstructure, in accordance with any number of different laws and modalities. If one region changes, the other sectors echo this shift in quite specific ways, since the whole network of reciprocal relationships is affected.

The existence of a particular whole is determined by the coherence of its inner structure in such a way that the mutual relations of its components are more explicit and more powerful than their connections with external factors. As a recent remark of Bergsonian inspiration puts it, either the weakening of internal cohesiveness, or the intensification of external forces can result in a loss of definition and the consequent destruction of the individual whole, either by fragmenting into smaller entities or by assimilation into another, higher level totality. What in one connection appears as internal can in another context be seen as external. When we assert that the external relations of any particular superstructure appear to be internal, the assertion is verified in those cases especially where those relations are necessary for the superstructure, i.e. part of the



very law of its being; so that without them the larger structure loses its self-identity. Essential external relations and conditions are simultaneously internal or immanent organizing factors in the dialectical totality of the superstructure: they are the regulative laws of the "contradictory" self-development of a complex totality.

Totalities interpenetrate and mingle reciprocally with one another; they are relational. We speak, therefore, of the many-faceted structure of a particular concrete totality and of the multi-dimensionality of the whole of objective reality.

An objective and practical delimiting of the inner relationships of a given object determines, finally, how we are to approach it theoretically, i.e. what methods we are to use in researching it. For example, sociology investigates Social phenomena as components of the social structure, i.e. it uses a method that is specifically different from that used by jurisprudence, ethics, or philosophy. But since no scientific field is entirely autonomous, each must take into consideration, in the course of its own development, the structural laws of other disciplines, especially the related ones (e.g. sociology must be aware of history, psychology, etc.), and also the broad regulative principles of the overarching theoretical discipline, viz. scientific philosophy.


The views of several Soviet philosophers are in fundamental agreement with our conclusions. As a concrete example, we cite V. S. Tiukhtin. On the basis of the structural approach, he feels that a thorough revision is needed in our interpretation of philosophical categories, since the interpretation is fundamentally erroneous, based as it is on traditional



qualitative-phenomenological (descriptive) speech-forms. It is transparently necessary to re-evaluate the content of the categories and laws of the materialist dialectic on the basis of the systemic-structural approach (or principle), which works throughout all scientific disciplines. Tiukhtin makes the further point that the category of interaction between the structural elements is the basic starting-point for the re-interpretation of all the other philosophical categories. In his opinion the potential equivalence of the concepts element and system consists in the fact that a particular system can function as an element or a sub-system in a larger system, that those elements which appear within the framework of the system as homogeneous are manifestly complexly articulated in their own inner reality, and, on the basis of their micro-analysis, can even look like micro-level systems themselves.

In principle, this means that the specific features of each element are essentially determined by the interaction of elements. Also in harmony with our point of view is Tiukhtin's contention that the cognition of the qualitative particularity of an object involves laying bare its specific structure.


According to Tiukhtin, the category of causality can be adequately interpreted only on the basis of structural interaction. He also devotes special attention to the categories of content and form. To remove structure from the category of content, Tiukhtin argues quite properly, means depriving the category of content of any real meaning. When the structure is transformed, a new object comes into being, and, consequently, content changes also. The category of form is therefore to be conceived in the sense of authentic



(172)

Marxism as a mode of existence of an object.

COMENIUS UNIVERSITY  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA



INDEX\*

to

Volumes I & II

- ALLPORT, GORDON, 131.  
Anguélov, Stefan, i.  
Aristotle, 121, 143.  
Augustine, iv, 91, 92.  
Avenarius, Richard, 17, 20.
- BACON, FRANCIS, iv.  
Bales, R., 131.  
Banu, Ion, i.  
Barth, Karl, iv.  
Bauer, Bruno, 70, 76-79.  
Bazarov, V., 17, 18.  
Becker, A., 82.  
Bellu, Niculae, i.  
Bentham, Jeremy, 30.  
Berdyaev, N., 92, 94.  
Berka, Karel, i.  
Berkeley, George, 25.  
Bertalaniffy, Ludwig von, 165.  
Bigot, Pierre, 18.  
Bogdanov, A., 17, 26.  
Bohm, David, 168.  
Bohr, Niels, 57, 58.  
Brutian, George, i.  
Bultmann, Rudolf, 115.
- CALVEZ, JEAN, 18, 20, 28.  
Camus, Albert, 33.  
Carnap, Rudolf, 139.  
Carr, E. H., 92, 94, 96.  
Chernov, V. M., 17.  
Chomsky, Noam, 142.  
Comte, Auguste, 91.  
Cornforth, Maurice, 141.  
Cornu, Auguste, i-ii, 61.  
Croce, Benedetto, 101.
- D'ANGELO, EDWARD, i.  
Democritus, 4.  
D'Ester, Karl, 66.  
Dewey, John, 25.  
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 97.
- ENGELS, FRIEDRICH, iv, 16,  
18, 20, 22, 27, 60, 61,  
63, 66-71, 74, 76, 79,  
80, 82, 83, 91, 99, 167.  
Epicurus, 4, 5, 15.  
Erickson, Erik, 130.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig, 7, 10-12,




- 15, 23, 45, 46, 51, 52,  
60, 62, 63, 66, 68, 69,  
80, 81, 91.  
**Fichte**, J. G., 20, 25, 91.  
**Frayer**, H., 94.  
**Fromm**, Erich, 131.
- GALILEO**, 48.  
**Gramsci**, Antonio, 45, 49.  
**Grün**, Karl, 82.
- HARE**, R. M., 142.  
**Hegel**, G. W. F., 4, 7, 8,  
10-13, 47, 54, 60-62,  
70, 76, 77, 90, 91,  
119.
- Heinzen**, Carl, 83.  
**Heisenberg**, Werner, 57.  
**Heller**, Agnes, i.  
**Herder**, J. G., 91.  
**Hess**, Moses, 67, 80-82.  
**Homes**, Y., 18.  
**Hock**, Sidney, 18, 25.  
**Hrušovský**, Igor, i, iv.  
**Hus**, Jan, iv.
- IRIBADJAKOV**, NIKOLAI, i, iv.
- JASPERS**, KARL, 93, 96.  
**Jesus**, 116, 117.  
**Jůzл, Miloš**, i.
- KANGRGA**, MILAN, 17, 20.  
**Kant**, Immanuel, 19, 45, 47,  
57, 76, 91, 97, 121.  
**Kolakowski**, Leszek, 17-19,  
21, 22, 27, 28.  
**Kork**, Jim, 25.  
**Kosík**, Karel, i.  
**Kuhlmann**, Georg, 82.
- LEFEBVRE**, HENRI, 17-19, 22,  
28.
- Leibniz**, G., 117, 124.  
**Lenin**, V. I., 17, 20, 22,  
25-28, 42, 90, 92, 95,  
98, 110, 112, 119, 122,  
123, 125-132, 148, 153.
- Lessing**, G. E., 97, 98.  
**Lewin**, Kurt, 131.
- Ley**, Hermann, i.  
**Lipset**, S., 130.  
**Locke**, John, 145.  
**Loeser**, Franz, i.  
**Lukács**, Georg, ii.  
**Luther**, Martin, 120.
- MACH**, ERNST, 17, 18, 21, 25.  
**Machovec**, Milan, i, iv.  
**Mao Tse-tung**, 118.  
**Maritain**, Jacques, 92, 94.  
**Marković**, Mihailo, ii, 17,  
19, 20, 22, 26, 29.  
**Márkus**, György, ii.  
**Marx**, Karl, 4, 5, 7-14, 18-  
20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29-  
31, 39, 41, 42, 44-49,  
51, 52, 54-56, 58, 60-63,



- 66-71, 76, 79, 80, 82,  
83, 90, 92, 95, 97-99,  
111-113, 115-123, 126,  
130, 132.
- Masaryk, T. G., iv.
- Maslow, 131.
- May, Rollo, 131.
- Mayer, E., 94.
- Meinecke, F., 93, 94.
- Merton, Robert, 131.
- Mikhailcev, Dimitre, 20, 28.
- Mill, John Stuart, 20.
- Mounier, E., 18.
- NICHOLAS, I, 94.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 83.
- Nixon, Richard, 124.
- PARSONS, HOWARD L., ii, iv,  
v.
- Parsons, T., 130.
- Pavlov, Todor, 28.
- Peirce, C. S., 146.
- Petrović, Gajo, 17, 20, 28.
- Piccone, Paul, iii.
- Planck, Max, 57.
- Plato, 114, 119.
- Popper, Karl R., 97, 101-  
104.
- Proudhon, Pierre, 83.
- RAHNER, KARL, 115.
- Rintelen, Fritz-Joachim von,  
95, 98.
- Ropke, W., 93, 96.
- Ruge, Arnold, 83.
- Russell, Bertrand, 139.
- SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL, 32.
- Schieder, T., 93.
- Schiller, F. von, 121.
- Schmauch, W. Christoph, 108.
- Shakespeare, William, 121.
- Skinner, B. F., 130.
- Spassov, Dobrin, i, v.
- Spengler, Oswald, 93.
- Stalin, Joseph, 31, 49, 56,  
110, 116,
- Steigerwald, Robert, i.
- Stirner, Max, 67, 70, 76-79,  
83, 91,
- Stojanovic, Svetozar, i.
- Supek, Rudi, 17.
- THEIMER, W., 97, 98.
- Tir, E., 18.
- Tiukhtin, V. S., 170.
- Tondl, Ladislav, i.
- Tordai, Zádor, i-iii.
- Toynbee, Arnold, 93, 94.
- Trotsky, Leon, 119.
- VAJDA, MIHÁLY, ii.
- Vranicki, Predrag, 17.
- WAGNER, RICHARD, 121.
- Wald, Henri, i.




Weber, Max, 39, 44.  
Weerth, Georg, 66.  
Weitling, W., 82, 83.  
Westphalen, Edgar von, 66.  
Weydemeyer, Joseph, 66.  
Wolff, Wilhelm, 66.  
Wolniewicz, Bogusław, i.  
  
YERMOLENKO, DIMITRI, i.



CORRIGENDA

- p. 33, line 3, par. 1  
himself, to himself,
- p. 76, line 4, par. 3  
creatin to creation
- p. 108, line 4, par. 2  
wrold to world
- p. 122, line 4, par. 1  
directd to directed





## Philosophical Studies of Related Interest

Howard L. Parsons & John Somerville, *Dialogues on the Philosophy of Marxism*. Greenwood Publishing (1971), 51 Riverside Ave., Westport, Conn.

Howard L. Parsons, *Ethics in the Soviet Union Today*. American Institute for Marxist Studies (1965) 20 East 30th Street, New York City.

Parsons, *Humanism and Marx's Thought*. Charles C. Thomas (1971), 301-327 E. Lawrence Ave., Springfield, Illinois.

Parsons, *Humanistic Philosophy in Contemporary Poland and Yugoslavia*. American Institute for Marxist Studies (1966).

Parsons, *Soviet Philosophers Speak: Some Contemporary Views*. American Institute for Marxist Studies (1967).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA  
3 1262 04202 7937

199.4  
DBE  
15.2  
2.2

**KEEP CARD IN POCKET**

**IT IS IMPORTANT THAT  
CARD BE KEPT IN POCKET**

Withdrawn from UF. Surveyed to Internet Archive